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INTRODUCTION
"Judicial decisionmaking represents social science in action."'
Controversy continues over whether to allow children unilaterally to
consent to mental health treatment 2 or, to refuse treatment and thus override
parental wishes.' The question involves diverse constitutional analysis of
procedural and substantive due process, privacy, and equal protection, as
well as societal values regarding the rights, roles, and responsibilities of
parents in deciding about treatment for their children.
While society, as reflected through our laws, has generally viewed
children as incapable of mature, adult-like decisionmaking, recent empirical
research suggests that even children as young as eleven are able to provide
informed consent for treatment and participate meaningfully in treatment
decisionmaking. 4 Allowing children to provide informed consent for mental
health treatment is particularly important because of the potentially signif-
icant liberty and privacy interests involved, the potentially significant impact
of treatment upon future life choices, and the treatment-enhancing effects
of allowing children to participate in treatment decisionmaking. Giving
children a voice in deciding treatment options is particularly important in
the mental health context because parents do not always act in the child's
best interests.
The purposes of this article are (1) to suggest a new view about the
competence of children to provide consent for mental health treatment; (2)
to propose needed legal reform by way of a statutory scheme; and (3) to
suggest practical approaches for informing children and determining a child's
capacity to provide informed consent. The paper presents proposals for new
legal definitions of competence and standards for informed consent when
minors are involved. A new statutory scheme is also proposed, based upon
empirical research on children's competence, which presents different stan-
dards according to the type of mental health treatment at issue: civil
commitment, outpatient psychopharmacological treatment, or outpatient
psychotherapy. The framework is designed to help ensure children's due
process rights by giving them a voice in their own treatment planning to
the greatest extent possible. No statutory scheme has yet been developed or
1. John M. Wisdom, Random Remarks on the Role of Social Sciences in the Judicial
Decision-making Process in School Desegregation Cases, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PRoas. 134, 148
(1975).
2. See, e.g., Diana Baumrind, Reciprocal Rights and Responsibilities in Parent-Child
Relations, 34 J. Soc. IssuEs 179 (1978); infra notes 44-45, 50-57.
3. While some state statutes require a child's consent in addition to the parent's for
certain treatments (such as civil commitment), few states allow a child unilaterally to veto a
parent's consent. Gerald P. Koocher, Competence to Consent: Psychotherapy, in CIfimEaN's
COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 111, 122 (Gary S. Melton et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter CHMDREN's
COMPETENCE].
4. See infra notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
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proposed that provides children an opportunity to consent to mental health
treatment commensurate with their capacity.
This framework underlies an argument that the law should reflect public
policy concerns that are based upon scientific data.5 A balance must be
struck between using scientific data as the benchmark for granting deci-
sionmaking rights to children on the one hand, and using positivistic legal
and social values on the other. The integrated statutory framework and
suggested models for defining capacity are innovative in this respect. The
paper also offers a practical paradigm for determining the capacity of an
individual child to provide informed consent, for as the suggested statutory
presumptions are generally rebuttable, it will still be necessary in most
instances to determine the capacity of any particular child.
I. TRADITIONAL VIEws OF THE ADULT ROLE IN DECISIONMAKING FOR
CHInDEN
A. Why Parents Do Not Always Act in the Child's Best Interests
"Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western Civilization
concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over
children.... More important, historically it has recognized that
natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interest
of their children."
6
"We can never assume that the people in the situation know what
the situation is."
'7
Courts have typically advanced two reasons to justify denying children
the right to consent to, or refuse, mental health treatment. First, the courts
perceive that children are not competent to make such life decisions. Second,
they assume that parents, in consultation with the clinician, will make
treatment decisions based upon the child's best interests. One of the main
theses of this paper, however, is that these assumptions are invalid.
The assumption that parents act in their child's best interest is intuitively
sensible and inherently appealing. It undoubtedly holds true in most families
under normal circumstances. However, the legal system has extended this
generally valid assumption to one area where it may not be tenable: the
5. See Michael J. Saks, Legal Policy Analysis and Evaluation, 44 AM. PsYcHOLoGIsT
1110 (1989) (arguing that main shortcoming of law is that it represents policy analysis without
using empirical data to support its assumptions or conclusions).
6. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (explaining denial to children of consti-
tutional right to independent judicial review when they are civilly committed).
7. R. D. LANG, Tan PoLircs oF THE FAMY AND OTmR EssAYs 33 (1971), quoted in
James W. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions,
62 CAL. L. Ray. 840, 862 (1974) (supporting contention that parents often cannot accurately
or objectively perceive nature of their child's problem* or their own causative role).
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mental health context. The mental health literature is filled with anecdotal,
case-study, and empirical data indicating that parents often act contrary to
the best interests of their child in the area of mental health treatment.
In fact, this problem is so widely perceived by mental health profes-
sionals that one could fairly say that the legal and mental health communities
generally hold inapposite views on the issue. While judges assume parents
are acting in the best interests of the child, clinicians often are cynical, or
at least cautious, about the role of the parent. As one psychologist states,
"I shall assume that the values, needs, desires and so-called best interests
of parents and their children are not necessarily congruent. In fact, I expect
that the best interests of parents and their children will often be different
or even contradictory." ' The following brief discussion may illustrate why
clinicians do not view the parental role so benignly:
Civil Commitment
Case 1. A boy's mother placed him in a hospital psychiatric unit. The
mother had been in outpatient therapy and was diagnosed as having a
borderline personality disorder, a serious mental illness characterized pri-
marily by emotional instability and self-destructive behaviors. She was
separated from her husband, caring for her four children alone. The boy
sought legal help, and the boy's lawyer won his release from the hospital.
Later, however, he was refused employment because of the psychiatric
hospitalization. 9
Case 2. A seven-year-old girl was hospitalized on a locked psychiatric
ward even though the psychiatric evaluation found "no evidence of thought
disorder, impairment in reality testing, [or] depression." Her parents had
her hospitalized because she had an older boyfriend of whom her parents
disapproved.1°
Psychotherapy
Case 3. A ten-year-old girl was repeatedly recommended for psychiatric
treatment by psychiatrists, social workers, and school guidance counselors
beginning in first grade. The mother failed to keep her appointments with
8. Koocher, supra note 3, at 112; see also Gail S. Perry & Gary B. Melton, Precedential
Value of Judicial Notice of Social Facts: Parham as an Example, 22 J. FAm. L. 633, 649
(1983-1984) (noting that "the considerable pressures on the modern family institution, and the
distorted dynamics of families of disturbed children ... invite caution in assuming the best
about parents' intentions . . .") (citations omitted)); JACK C. WESTMAN, CHILD ADVOCACY:
NEW PROFESSIONAL ROLES FOR HELPING FAmiLiES 400 (1979) (arguing that "[aln important
aspect of modern psychiatric knowledge is the fact that many children identified as mental
patients are responding to disturbed family situations"). But see JosEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 122 (1979) (stating that "[c]hildren are by definition
persons in need of adult caretakers [parents] who determine what is best for them").
9. Koocher, supra note 3, at 123.
10. Holly Metz, Branding Juveniles Against Their Will, STUDENT LAWYER, Feb. 1992,
at 21, 22.
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therapists, and the school ultimately petitioned the court to have the child
declared neglected. The court placed her in foster care, stating that "the
mother's failure to provide medical care ... may be interpreted to include
psychiatric medical care where it is necessary to prevent the impairment of
the child's emotional condition.""
Case 4. A nine-year-old girl's parents were members of a fundamentalist
religious group and had relatively inflexible standards and expectations.
They sought psychotherapy for her and were concerned because she wore
pants, contradicted her parents in conversations, did not sit still in church,
and had been associating with the "wrong crowd." She had no disciplinary
problems at school, however, and was doing well academically. A psycho-
logical evaluation was within normal limits.
12
Medications
Case 5. A ten-year-old was placed on Ritalin for hyperactivity. The
prescribing physician was a pediatrician who regularly treated hyperactive
children with Ritalin, rather than a psychiatrist. Neither the parents, the
referring teacher, nor the pediatrician discussed or even considered alter-
natives to the Ritalin therapy. 3
Case 6. The mother of a retarded girl gave her about four times her
prescribed dose of lithium, a potentially lethal dosage. The mother did this
hoping it would sedate her so that the mother would not have to cope with
her troublesome behaviors.'
4
The above cases are examples of parents not acting in the child's best
interests in three areas discussed in this paper: civil commitment, outpatient
psychotherapy, and outpatient treatment with medication. Why did parents
in these cases, as in so many others, fall to serve their, own child's best
interests? Put another way, why are parents themselves often a significant
cause of the child's problems?
An important perspective is provided by family-systems theory. 5 Its
premise, used frequently by family therapists to understand families and
based upon considerable empirical support, is that a child's problems cannot
be meaningfully separated from those of the family. Childhood emotional
disturbances are increasingly viewed as the results of disturbed family
systems;' 6 families of emotionally disturbed children differ significantly from
11. In re Ray, 408 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Faro. Ct. 1978).
12. Koocher, supra note 3, at 123.
13. Ellen Colburn-Rohn, Toward Competence: An Eclectic Approach, J. BioETMcs 3, 6
(1983).
14. The hypothetical is derived from an actual case based on the experience of the
author, while working as a clinical psychologist.
15. See generally Patricia Minuchin, Families and Individual Development: Provocations
From the Field of Family Therapy, 56 CID Day. 289 (1985); LYNN HorniAN, FOUNDATIONS
oF FAMILY THERAPY (1981).
16. See, e.g., Minuchin, supra note 15.
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those with "normal" children. 17 The family is the problem, not the child.
In dysfunctional families, for example, a "problem child" may allow other
family members to avoid dealing with their own problems and to rationalize
family difficulties as caused by the child. Thus, a child's behavior may not
be related to underlying mental illness," but may reflect adaptation to a
home environment that does not provide adequately for him or her. 9
A wealth of literature suggests that often the child may not be the
primary source of the problem. Frequently it is the parent who is mentally
ill rather than the child; one study found this true in twenty-five percent
of the cases where the parent was presenting the child for treatment.
20
Parents also often blame children for their own problems or project or
displace their own feelings onto the child. Parents may use the child as the
family scapegoat, 2' blaming all family problems on the child's behavior.'2
The family itself may be dysfunctional, caught in a cycle of mutual psy-
chopathology of which the child is but one part. Many children whose
parents request commitment appear to be members of a dysfunctional or
disturbed family system.23 A disturbed family system may be partly respon-
sible for the child's bizarre behaviors which, in turn, cause the parent to
misinterpret the child's behaviors and needs.
As several of the above cases illustrate, parents frequently exaggerate
the significance of a child's acting-out behaviors or unwillingness to conform
to parental expectations. A California Assembly committee investigating
juvenile court dockets, for example, found that many parental petitions
17. E. Navis Hetherington & Burclay Martin, Family Interaction, in PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL
DISORDERS OF CHILDHOOD (Herbert C. Quay & John S. Werry eds., 2d ed. 1979).
18. See, e.g., THOMAS S. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 154 (1963) (stating that
psychiatric diagnoses are labels signifying that individual does not act according to expectations);
see also Nancy E. Waxier, Culture and Mental Illness: A Social Labeling Perspective, 159 J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 379 (1974) (noting that patient receives reinforcement for behaving
in accordance with "sick role").
Others similarly question the reliability or validity of psychiatric diagnosis. For example,
Kathy Kosnoff, a staff attorney with Minnesota's Mental Health Law Project, observes correctly
that "Psychiatry is a soft science .... You can find yourself and most of your friends in the
DSM-III-R." Metz, supra note 10, at 26. (DSM-III-R is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual,
the diagnostic manual used in psychiatric diagnosis.) See also Erica E. Goode, Sick or Just
Quirky?, U.S. NEws & WORLD RaP., Feb. 10, 1992, at 49.
19. WEsTrmAlN, supra note 8, at 12; R. D. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE 114-15
(1967) (arguing that "without exception the experience and behavior that gets labelled schiz-
ophrenic is a special strategy that a person invents in order to live in an unlivable situation")
(emphasis in original).
20. THOMAS J. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 171 (1966).
21. Charles W. Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical Issues,
48 NoTm DAME L. RaV. 133, 138 (1972); Ezra F. Vogel & Norman W. Bell, The Emotionally
Disturbed Child as the Family Scapegoat, in A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY 382
(1962).
22. For an excellent discussion of the problem, see David W. Simmonds, Children's
Rights and Family Dysfunction: "Daddy Why Do I Have to be the Crazy One?," in CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS AND THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS 33 (Gerald P. Koocher ed., 1976).
23. Hetherington & Martin, supra note 17.
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were for relatively "trivial" adolescent acts.24 "Well adjusted youths who
need no help whatever from the courts typically at some time or other while
growing up get drunk, stay out late, have sex, cut school; others rebel
against parental authority. If left alone most survive and become normal
adults."25
In the case of civil commitment, parents may place the child in an
institution simply to relieve family stress, particularly in situations where
single working parents cannot effectively supervise the child. The prevalence
of child abuse and neglect 26 also suggests that parents do not always act in
a child's best interests. Because parents are not typically mental health
professionals and also because their concerns must include the well-being
of the family as a whole rather than solely that of the child, commitment
decisions often are made based upon a misunderstanding of the child's
behaviors or a desire to do what is best for the family.
B. Why Mental Health Professionals Do Not Always Act in the Child's
Best Interests
"What is best for a child is an individual medical decision that
must be left to the judgment of physicians in each case." 27
Case 7. A psychiatrist regularly commits a child for periodic stays in a
mental hospital when his mentally-ill mother, a patient of the psychiatrist,
needs a respite period from her child. Although the child has no mental
illness, the psychiatrist creates a diagnosis for purposes of admission. The
special committing justice, aware of these facts, nevertheless allows the
commitment in the belief that the child is better off away from his mother
while her mental state is emotionally fragile.
28
Case 8. One private psychiatric hospital in California pays a local
psychiatrist a substantial fee for patient admissions, while the marketing
director of another children's psychiatric hospital is also. a member of a
school committee charged with deci4ing what to do with troublesome
students. 2
9
Case 9. An advertisement for a private children's psychiatric hospital
includes the following copy: "Is your teenager irresponsibly rebellious, or
24. ANGELA R. HOLDER, LEGAL IsSuEs IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 264-65
(1985).
25. REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
JUVENILE JUSTICE PROCESSES 7 (1971).
26. Over one million reports of child abuse and neglect are made each year. Robert
Weisberg & Michael Wald, Confidentiality Laws and State Efforts to Protect Abused or
Neglected Children: The Need for Statutory Reform, in PSYCHOTIERAPY AND THE LAW 157
(Louis Everstine & Diana S. Everstine eds., 1986).
27. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 (1979).
28. Actual case, circa 1989, as related to the author by a civil commitment justice in
Virginia.
29. Metz, supra note 10, at 28-29.
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out of control? Running with the wrong crowd? Headed down the path of
no future? Help your son or daughter before it's too late." 30
Like parents, mental health professionals do not always act in the
child's best interests, making judicial review desirable in many cases. Al-
though the above quotation from Parham v. J.R.31 presents the rationale
that mental health professionals act in the child's best interests, the cases
described are but several of many which could be used to illustrate the
tenuousness of this assumption. While most clinicians do not intentionally
act contrary to the child's best interests, pressures from family and insti-
tutions or diagnostic error may result in inappropriate treatment recom-
mendations.
Like parents, clinicians may misperceive the need for treatment. It can
be difficult for clinicians to determine if the child is being scapegoated by
family members,3 2 and evidence suggests that clinicians tend to overdi-
agnose.33 The often stressful and unfamiliar circumstances under which a
child is initially assessed for treatment generally are not ideal for providing
an accurate evaluation, further contributing to the already relatively unre-
liable nature of childhood psychiatric diagnosis.3 4 In the case of civil
commitment, for example, institutions typically do not conduct an extensive
investigation of the child's family or history. Inappropriate commitment or
medication of children for relatively mild conditions is common, and has
been well documented.
3 5
There are also potentially serious conflicts of interest inherent when the
parent brings a child for treatment. The child is the identified patient, so
the clinician theoretically is bound to serve only the child's best interests.
However, the parent is probably paying the fee, which might make it
difficult to resist subtle pressures to carry out the parent's wishes. Clinicians
may also simply identify more with the concerns of the parents than those
of the child. "While the goal of the psychiatrist will be expressed-and
perceived-as the best welfare of the child-patient, it is the parent who has
come to seek help, whose situation seems most desperate, who seems the
most reliable source of information about what is wrong, [and] who is
closest to the psychiatrist in age and social outlook .... 36 Moreover,
30. Id. at 21.
31. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
32. James W. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental
Institutions, 62 CAL. L. REv. 840, 859-61 (1974); Gary B. Melton, Family and Mental Hospitals
as Myths: Civil Commitment of Minors, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH, AND THE LAW 151,
161 (N. Dickson Reppucci et al. eds., 1984).
33. Daniel Offer et al., The Mental Health Profession's Concept of the Normal Adoles-
cent, 38 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 149 (1981).
34. See Thomas M. Achenbach, DSM-III in Light of Empirical Research on the Clas-
sification of Child Psychopathology, 19 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 395 (1980); Jared
H. Kashani et al., Depression and Depressive Symptoms in Preschool Children from the
General Population, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1138 (1986).
35. See infra notes 193-205, 258-59 and accompanying text.
36. Ellis, supra note 32, at 868.
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many commentators have reported substantial conflicts of interest when the
admitting clinician has a close professional relationship with a private
psychiatric hospital.
3 7
Where civil commitment and psychotropic medical treatment are con-
sidered, and the child is not competent to consent or refuses to consent to
treatment, judicial review would help to ensure greater protection against
potentially harmful forced treatment. A judge or administrative review board
could hear advocacy on both sides with the benefit of the truth-finding
power of an adversarial hearing, and reach a judgment based on legal rather
than medical criteria." Importantly, the decision would not be made solely
by one clinician, who may be too close to the problem, who may be in
diagnostic or prognostic error, and who may have conflicts of interest. In
cases where the patient is provided vigorous advocacy, judicial hearings
appear to decrease the incidence of inappropriate hospitalization.39
37. For an excellent review of the problem, see Metz, supra note 10, at 28-29 (reporting
that legislators, concerned about this problem, introduced bill in Kentucky legislature requiring
that evaluating clinician not receive any financial benefit from child's hospitalization). Ado-
lescent psychiatric hospitals are now a major cottage industry, being very lucrative. Id. The
article quotes Dr. Lee Combrinck-Graham, former director of the Institute for Juvenile
Research in Chicago, who says that the reason for the recent dramatic increases in adolescent
psychiatric admissions "is not because the kids need this care but because it's productive and
lucrative." Id.
38. But see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979) (stating that "we do not accept
the notion that the shortcomings of specialists can always be avoided by shifting the decision
... to an untrained judge.... Even after a hearing, the nonspecialist decisionmaker must
make a medical-psychiatric decision").
In the case of civil commitment, criteria for commitment in most states is either that the
child is dangerous to self or to others, or that he is in need of treatment. (The latter criterion,
often termed "functional capacity," typically implies an inability to function in the environment
adequately without such treatment.) See RICHARD E. REDDING, DUE PRocEss PROTECTIONS FOR
JUVENILES IN CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEDURES 25-26 (Elissa C. Lichtenstein et al. eds., 1991).
A large body of research, however, suggests that clinicians cannot predict future dangerousness
any more reliably than the untrained layman. See generally James C. Beck, Psychiatric
Assessment of Potential Violence: A Reanalysis of the Problem, in THE POTENTIALLY VIOLENT
PATIENr AND T TATAsoFn DECISION IN PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 83 (James C. Beck ed., 1985);
John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Developments in Psychology and Law,
in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW (C. James Scheirer & Barbara L. Hammonds eds., 1983); Henry
J. Steadman, The Right Not to be a False Positive: Problems in the Application of the
Dangerousness Standard, in PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT RIGHTS AND PATIENT ADVOCACY 129, 143
(Bernard L. Bloom & Shirley J. Asher eds., 1982) (stating that "[n]owhere in the research
literature is there any documentation that clinicians can predict dangerous behavior beyond
the level of chance"). Regarding functional capacity, a judge probably can evaluate a child's
ability to function at school, at home, etc., just as well as a clinician. See GARY B. MELTON
ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR Tm COURTS 15 (1987) (arguing that "[w]hether a
person appears sufficiently 'crazy' to warrant special legal treatment is an intuitive social and
moral judgment. Diagnosis, for example, is largely irrelevant to mental health law questions").
39. See Raj K. Gupta, New York's Mental Health Information Service: An Experiment
in Due Process, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 405, 438 (1971); Virginia A. Hiday, The Role of Counsel
in Civil Commitment: Changes, Effects, and Determinants, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 551, 560
(1977) (noting that in hearings where attorneys actively challenged commitment recommenda-
tion, only 45% of respondents were committed).
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II. TRADITIONAL VIEws OF CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE
"Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make
sound judgments ... including their need for medical care or
treatment. Parents can and must make those judgments." 4
Children traditionally have been treated as second-class citizens-viewed
by our society and in our courts as incapable of mature decisionmaking. 4'
Thus, they generally have been denied the right independently to seek or
refuse mental health treatment. It has been argued that children are "the
most oppressed of all minorities, ' 42 denied a voice in making their own life
decisions and thereby denigrated in their personhood. 4 Some children's
rights advocates have argued that children should be involved in their own
life decisions," and that one way to prevent the exploitation of children is
to give them a voice in decisions affecting them, perhaps even irrespective
of their competence.
45
The very practice of disclosing information to patients and obtaining
informed consent is rooted in the notion of respect for individual autonomy,
an ethical principle which is generally overriding in biomedical decision-
making in western societies. 46 Respect for autonomy necessitates valuing the
40. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (explaining denial to children of consti-
tutional right to independent review of commitment decision "[s]imply because the decision
of a parent is not agreeable to a child").
41. Gary B. Melton, Toward "Personhood" for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as
Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYcHOLOGIST 99 (1983) [hereinafter Melton, Toward "Per-
sonhood']; Gary B. Melton, The Clashing of Symbols: Prelude to Child and Family Policy,
42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 345 (1987) [hereinafter Melton, Clashing of Symbols].
42. THE CHILDREN 's RIGHTS MOVEMENT: OVERCOMING THE OPPRESSION OF YOUNG PEOPLE
1 (Beatrice Gross & Ronald Gross eds., 1977).
43. Melton, Toward "Personhood", supra note 41; Melton, Clashing of Symbols, supra
note 41; see also Stuart N. Hart, From Property to Person Status: Historical Perspective on
Children's Rights, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 53, 57 (1991) (arguing that public policy requires
"positive ideology of children, valuing them for what they are ... ").
44. See, e.g., JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD (1974); Henry H. Foster, Jr. &
Doris W. Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAi. L.Q. 343 (1972); Melton, Toward
"Personhood, " supra note 41.
45. See, e.g., Leon Letwin, After Goss v. Lopez: Student Status as Suspect Classifica-
tion?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 627, 641-42 (1977) ("the 'competency' of the claimant bears little or
no relationship to the issue of entitlement, primarily where the liberties involved are aimed
not at maximizing free choice but at civilizing the process and instruments of state compul-
sion .... Procedural due process does not immunize persons against deprivations of life,
liberty or property; it simply insists on a degree of fairness and humanity .... To that degree
the capacity of children has nothing to do with their right to be treated fairly, decently and
humanely by their government. They are entitled to such treatment not because they are
competent but because they are persons."); see also Hillary Rodham, Children's Rights: A
Legal Perspective, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 21, 21-36 (Patricia A.
Vardin & Irene N. Brody eds., 1979) (arguing that child's legal capacity should be presumed
unless rebutted); HOLT, supra note 44 (arguing that children should be afforded same rights
as adults); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 103 (1982).
46. See generally ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAmsS E. CHILDPEss, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMDICAL
ETHIcs (3rd ed. 1989).
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individual's competence and preferences and allowing him or her to exercise
choice to the fullest extent possible. 47 The philosopher Immanuel Kant
taught that "respect for autonomy flows from the recognition that all
persons have unconditional worth."48
Much of the current law regarding children's capacity is based upon
common lore, traditional assumptions about children's abilities, and ideal-
istic views about the role of parents in making decisions for their children.
49
The United States Supreme Court has often viewed children as being in
need of benevolent protection" "from the exercise of their own volition."' 5
In Ginsberg v. New York,5 2 Justice Stewart wrote that "a child ... is
not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice .... It is only
upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights ... deprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable
for adults." 53 In Belotti v. Baird,5 4 the Court observed that "states validly
may limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making
47. Id. at 71.
48. Id. (citing IMMANUEL KANT, GRouNDwoRK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MoRALs (H. J.
Paton trans., 1964)).
49. Professor Melton argues that the Court has made many assumptions about children
and families that are not supported by, or are contrary to, social science data. These idealistic
assumptions and "myths" of our positivist legal system often are presented in judicial opinions
as natural law or scientific fact. He points out that when:
myths are used to provide ruses for political or legal action, the actual goals of
policy are obscured .... [I]f incompetence were the real basis for denial of liberty
for adolescents, empirical evidence rebutting the hypothesis should result in a change
in policy. Such a result is unlikely, because the statements were intended to promote
a particular mythical view of reality derived from a fundamental value of deference
to authority.
Melton, Clashing of Symbols, supra note 41, at 351. "Derivation of notions of how the world
is from values as to how it ought to be is not a rational basis for public policy." Gary B.
Melton, Developmental Psychology and the Law: The State of the Art, 22 J. FAM. L. 445,
455 (1984) [hereinafter Melton, Developmental Psychology].
It has been the author's experience, however, that lawyers also do not have the same
degree of confidence in social science research as do mental health professionals. Even where
a sizeable and convincing body of reliable research suggests the inaccuracy of a particular
legal assumption, this often will not dissuade attorneys from maintaining the positivistic
assumption. The lawyer's response frequently is that social science research findings are
unreliable, subject to differing interpretations, and subject to bias as a function of researchers'
own viewpoints on the very questions which the research is designed to address. Lawyers
especially distrust the reliance upon statistical analysis. Thus, the scientific method may not
have the same appeal to lawyers as it does to social scientists. Legal analysis is shaped more
by historical tradition, philosophical and ethical tenets and assumptions, and judicial and
political constraints, than it is by scientific research findings.
50. See, e.g., GoLDS)mN ET AL., supra note 8; Carl M. Rogers & Lawrence S. Wrightsman,
Attitudes Toward Children's Rights: Nurturance or Self-Determination?, 34 J. Soc. IssuEs 59,
63-65 (1978) (noting that survey of 381 persons found that majority disfavored affording
greater self-determination rights to juveniles).
51. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973).
52. 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
53. Id.
54. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II).
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of important affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences [be-
cause] during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors
often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them." 5 Finally, in Thompson v.
Oklahoma5 6 the Court stated that "[ilnexperience, less education, and less
intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his
or her conduct .... The difference that separates children from adults for
most purposes of the law is children's immature, undeveloped ability td
reason in an adultlike manner." ' 57 Thus, the Court has afforded children
fewer rights than adults based upon a competency distinction: children are
less competent psychologically than adults.
This incapacity theory of childhood is the basis for much current
constitutional law about children's rights." "[Tihe law has generally re-
55. Id. at 635. But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (citing works of Piaget, Elkind, Kohlberg) (stating that "there is substantial
agreement among child psychologists and sociologists that the moral and intellectual maturity
of the 14-year-old approaches that of adults").
56. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
57. Id. at 835-36 n.43 (citing VICTOR L. STREmI, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 1987).
58. Numerous commentators, especially those operating within a social science perspec-
tive, have argued that the judiciary fails to consider adequately available social science research
because the findings frequently conflict with common-sense assumptions or fundamental legal
principles. See generally REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH
(Gary B. Melton ed., 1987) [hereinafter REFORMING THE LAw]; Gary B. Melton, Bringing
Psychology to the Legal System: Opportunities, Obstacles, and Efficacy, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
488 (1987). Lawyers also generally fall to consider empirical research because they have no
training in scientific methodology. "The heart of the problem, I suspect, is that lawyers and
social scientists come from two different cultures .... [L]aw students are typically smart
people who do not like math. The quantitative, empirical social and behavioral sciences exist
in another world." Saks, supra note 5, at 1115.
One example directly on point concerns the issue of children's ability to provide informed
consent. The Society for Research in Child Development convened an expert panel which
published a book reviewing research on children's competence to consent. See REFORMING THE
LAW, supra. Five years later, its impact had been minimal, as measured by its frequency of
citation in judicial opinions. This is unfortunate; the informed consent question provides an
ideal opportunity for the use of social science in shaping legal policy and for interdisciplinary
cooperation, because of the need to determine a child's psychological competency to provide
a legally valid consent.
Another reason for judges' reluctance to rely upon social science research may be the
perception that it is relatively unreliable, at least when measured against legal standards. The
American Psychological Association filed amicus briefs in two cases involving minor abortion
statutes (Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987), reh'g denied, 484 U.S. 1082 (1988) and
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)),
arguing that minors should be allowed to make abortion decisions because minors 14 years of
age and older are as competent as adults. However, due to the lack of extensive research on
many important questions concerning the competence of children, "[t]he briefs overstated what
is known about the development of decision-making skills." William Gardner et al., Asserting
Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
895, 897 (1989). Judge Craven, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, opined
that "courts are uneasy in the presence of the ultimate findings or conclusions of the social
sciences because we have many times consumed large quantities of social science-from Dred
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garded minors as having a lesser capacity for making important decisions."
59
Indeed, the presumption that children are incompetent serves as "a paradigm
for the manner in which the legal system deals with children,"' 0 typically
denying them any decisionmaking role in their own medical treatment. 6'
Research, however, indicates that children often are capable of making
important life decisions in a rational manner, including decisions about
medical and psychological treatment. 62
Scott to Lochner-only to have to regurgitate it." J. Braxton Craven, Jr., The Impact of
Social Science Evidence on the Judge: A Personal Comment, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 150,
151 (1975). It may be true also that when judges do use social science data, they do so
incompetently. See James R. Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases and
Briefs, 14 LAW & Hum. BEHAv. 25, 40 (1990).
While currently there is a significant and compelling body of research indicating that
children ages 14-15 are capable of mature decisionmaking, how can we be satisfied that it
provides a sufficiently reliable foundation upon which to base legal policy? Several methods
are available for making this determination. Although these methods are beyond the scope of
the present paper, they are worth mentioning to illustrate their potential feasibility.
Meta-analysis is a powerful method of combining the results of numerous studies in order
to determine what general conclusions are most reliable. See generally Gene V. Glass et al.,
META-ANALYSiS iN SocIAL RESEARCH (1981); Bert F. Green & Judith A. Hall, Quantitative
Methods for Literature Reviews, 35 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 37 (1984). This is useful for
determining whether research results are generally consistent in their findings. In terms of
consistently applying research findings in adjudication, Professors Monahan and Walker have
proposed that data be treated in the same way as legal precedent, with relevant criteria being
relevancy to the case, validity of the methodology (the degree to which the research is accepted
by the scientific community may be largely dispositive), and extent to which other research
also leads to the same conclusions. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority:
Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. Rav. 477 (1986).
59. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977).
60. Gerald P. Koocher, Children Under Law: The Paradigm of Consent, in REFORMING
THE LAW, supra note 58, at 6.
61. The right generally to control one's own body and mind is a fundamental right
accorded constitutional protections derived from the right to privacy, as defined by the liberty
interest contained in the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Jacobson v.. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 26 (1905); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 543-45 (1942) (Stone,
C.J., concurring).
Laws that deprive a psychologically competent child the right to exercise this fundamental
right arguably violate substantive due process in that they are not narrowly tailored. By
establishing absolute minimum age cut-offs which disallow both incompetent as well as
competent children the right to refuse or consent to treatment, such laws are overinclusive. If
a law "significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld
unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate
only those interests." Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
It could also be argued that denying a psychologically competent child the right to decide
on his or her own medical treatment violates the Equal Protection Clause, which requires that
individuals similarly situated be treated equally. Although parents have a fundamental right
to make certain childrearing decisions without government interference, see, e.g., Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400
(1923), it is debatable whether parental rights should override the rights of the child when the
child's psychological competence to decide is not significantly different from that of the
parent(s).
62. See generally CHmiDREN'S COMPETENCE, supra note 3 (providing state of the art
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III. RECENT RESEARCH ON CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE
"We reject a positivistic approach to the normative ordering of
child, family, and state, but we adhere to a belief in empiricism.1 63
A sizeable and convincing body of empirical research has accumulated
over the last decade suggesting that children have much more competence
than has been recognized by the legal community.64 The general picture
which emerges is that children are capable of quite a lot, if you just let
them participate in the decisionmaking process. 65
Adolescents, and frequently even younger children, are capable of adult-
like understanding and decisionmaking. 6 For instance, children as young as
about twelve appear to have a factual understanding and appreciation for
the risks and benefits of psychotherapy. Discussing unpleasant or uncom-
fortable issues, discomfort with the therapist, violations of confidentiality,
and poor treatment effectiveness are identified as risks; having someone to
talk with, learning things, and solving problems are seen as benefits.67 Even
nine-year-olds appear to understand many basic aspects of treatment,68
including differences between various diagn.oses and prognoses, and treat-
ment risks and benefits. 69 Twelve-year-olds are able to define accurately
many basic legal concepts.70 Significantly, children as young as six can be
astute in perceiving procedural injustice;7 1 thus, allowing children to partic-
ipate in decisionmaking regarding their own health may enhance children's
perception that they have been treated fairly.
There is also evidence that allowing children to participate in treatment
decisionmaking improves treatment by facilitating the child's willingness to
cooperate.7 2 Such participation may also help reduce the stress of therapy, 73
review of research); Gardner et al., supra note 58; Nancy Kaser-Boyd et al., Minor's Ability
to Identify Risks and Benefits of Therapy, 16 PROF. PSYCHOL. 411 (1985); Melton, Develop-
mental Psychology, supra note 49; Lois Weithorn & Susan Campbell, The Competency of
Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982).
63. Gary B. Melton, Guidelines for Effective Diffusion of Child Development Research
into the Legal System, in REFOPMNG THE LAW, supra note 58, at 280.
64. See infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
66. The specific capacities of children at different ages are discussed in detail in Part
VI-B.
67. Kaser-Boyd et al., supra note 62, at 414-15.
68. Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 62, at 1596.
69. Michael C. Roberts et al., Children's Perceptions of Medical and Psychological
Disorders in their Peers, 10 J. OF CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 76 (1981).
70. Karen Saywitz et al., Children's Knowledge of Legal Terminology, 14 L. & HuM.
BEHAv. 523, 527-28 (1990).
71. Lauia J. Gold et al., Children's Perceptions of Procedural Justice, 55 CHILD DEV.
1752, 1758 (1984).
72. See Rochelle T. Bastien & Howard S. Adelman, Noncompulsory Versus Legally
Mandated Placement, Perceived Choice, and Response to Treatment Among Adolescents, 52
J. CONSULTNrG & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 171, 177 (1984).
73. Gary B. Melton, Children's Participation in Treatment Planning, in CHILDREN'S
COMPETENCE, supra note 3, at 246, 250-51.
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lead to better attitudes about treatment, 74 reduce resistance to therapy, 75 and
foster appropriate treatment expectations.7 6 The child achieves a sense of
control and self-efficacy critical for mental health and positive therapeutic
outcomes. Clinicians generally agree that treatment outcomes are poor when
children are forced to receive treatment.
77
Researchers have found that merely seeking a child's informed consent
at the outset improves treatment effectiveness significantly.78 Moreover,
permitting children to provide informed consent may actually facilitate
competence79 because children have not had much experience with exercising
rights.80 Allowing children to exercise legal rights may help them to develop
decisionmaking competencies relating to legal issues and life choices, and
gradually to assume adult-like responsibilities.8"
IV. MODELS OF COMPETENCE
"The search for a single test of competence is a search for the
Holy Grail."8 2
A. Definitions and Standards
There is no single theory or definition of competency83 within either the
legal or mental health communities.84 Commentators, however, have pro-
74. See generally SHARON S. BRasmi, THE APPLICATION OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY TO
CLINICAL PRACTICE (1976); EDWARD L. DECI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF DETERMINATION (1980).
75. Genevieve B. Oxley, Involuntary Clients' Responses to a Treatment Experience, 58
Soc. CASEWORK 607 (1977).
76. Lois L. Weithorn, Involving Children in Decisions Affecting Their Own Welfare:
Guidelines for Professionals, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE, supra note 3, at 235, 241-42.
77. See Bastien & Adelman, supra note 72, at 171.
78. See id. at 178 (stating that adolescents whose consent was sought tended to perceive
they had choice even when treatment was mandatory, whereas failure to seek consent led to
perceptions of no choice even when treatment was not mandatory).
79. Gary B. Melton, Decisionmaking by Children: Psychological Risks and Benefits, in
CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE, supra note 3, at 27-28; June L. Tapp & Gary B. Melton, Preparing
Children for Decisionmaking: Implications of Legal Socialization Research, in CHILDREN's
COMPETENCE, supra note 3, at 215, 217-18.
80. See Sigmund E. Dragastin, Epilogue: Research Themes and Priorities, in ADOLES-
CENCE AND THE LFE CYCLE 291, 296 (Sigmund E. Dragastin & Glen H. Elder eds., 1975)
(stating that "the main difference in cognitive maturity in adolescents and adults may relate
to levels of social participation: the picture one has for himself of what he is authorized to
do and empowered to do").
81. The 1978 Presidential Commission on Mental Health recommended that children be
allowed to participate in decisionmaking "as a sound strategy to enable young people to
undertake responsible and rewarding involvement in the adult world." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
ON MENTAL HEALTH, 3 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
MENTAL HEALTH 638 (1978) (U.S. Gov't Printing Office No. 040-000-00392-4) (Report of the
Task Panel on Mental Health).
82. Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 279, 283 (1977).
83. Although the terms competence and capacity are sometimes used interchangeably,
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posed various models defining competency for treatment decisionmaking,
and analogous standards have been adopted in various state statutess or by
various courts.86 Typical standards include (1) factual understanding of the
problem and the treatment alternatives; (2) rational decisionmaking proc-
esses; (3) appreciation for the personal implications of the decision; (4)
ability to make and communicate a choice; (5) a reasonable choice; or (6)
general competence.
The factual standard generally requires an understanding of the diagnosis
and the psychological nature of the illness, treatment alternatives available
and their probabilities of success, the risks and benefits of each alternative,1
7
and one's role and rights in the informed consent process.88 The rational
decisionmaking standard may include a determination of whether the person
has weighed the risks and benefits, calculated the probabilities, provided
sound reasons, or generally shown adult problem-solving capacities.8 9 Ac-
cording to Professors Appelbaum and Grisso, rational decisionmaking is
"the ability to reach conclusions that are logically consistent with the starting
premises."' 9 The appreciation standard requires an appreciation of the
relationships between various alternatives to one's own values and present
as well as future life situation, 9 and the ability to draw inferences and
think abstractly about future consequences. 92 Thus, appreciation seems to
require not only adult-like cognitive skills but adequate emotional maturity
as well. (Several commentators have suggested that these three standards
represent increasing levels of maturity, with appreciation being the hardest
test to satisfy.)93
capacity is a legal term of art which is used to denote competence to consent for a particular
treatment. STANLEY S. HERR, LEGAL RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH CAaE 31-32 (1983). Thus,
the term "capacity" implies that competence can vary as a function of the type of decision
to be made. Similarly, in this paper, the term "capacity" will be used in the context of
children's ability to provide informed consent for a specific treatment.
84. See generally PAUL S. APPELBAUJM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine:
Striking A Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wisc. L.
REV. 413, 446-47 (1979); Roth et al., supra note 82; Allan M. Tepper & Amiram Elwork,
Competence to Consent to Treatment as a Psycholegal Construct, 8 L. & Hum. BEHl . 205
(1984).
85. See, e.g., infra note 103.
86. Meisel, supra note 84, at 442.
87. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to
Treatment, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1635, 1636 (1988).
88. Id.
89. Meisel, supra note 84, at 444-45.
90. Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 87, at 1636.
91. See Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Competency to Consent to Research: A
Psychiatric Overview, 39 ARCH. OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 951 (1982); Weithorn, supra note 76, at
248.
92. Lois A. Weithorn, Children's Capacities for Participation in Treatment Decision
Making, in EMERGING IssUEs IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 28 (Diane H. Schetky &
Elissa P. Benedek eds., 1985).
93. Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 91; Barbara Stanley, Informed Consent in Treatment
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The evidence of choice standard requires only that the individual com-
municate a choice. 94 The reasonable choice standard evaluates decisionmak-
ing according to the outcome, requiring that the choice be reasonable and
not the product of mental illness.95 Finally, the general competency standard
considers overall competence, which may be determined with reference to
diagnosis, appearance, or prior behavior. 96 Some writers have proposed
using general competency as a threshold standard, with one of the other
specific competency standards as an added test.
97
B. Deciding Which Standard to Use
The standard used varies according to the legal issues and the risk,
perceived by the clinician or judge, of a poorly made decision. 98 Decision-
making about certain options may require relatively greater or lesser expe-
rience, emotional readiness, or cognitive maturity. In cases where the
individual's capacity is questionable or marginal, a risk-benefit analysis of
the treatment is often considered by clinicians in deciding whether to allow
the patient unilaterally to consent. 99 Commentators suggest that if the
potential benefits significantly outweigh the risks, a demanding standard of
capacity is typically used by clinicians when the patient is trying to refuse
treatment. Conversely, if the benefits are low and the risks high, a low
standard of capacity is more often used in order more readily to allow the
patient to refuse treatment. (The reverse situation applies when the patient
wishes to consent to the treatment.) Thus, as long as a patient decides as
the physician wishes, competency questions generally do not arise.'0°
Regardless of the standard used, however, it is generally recognized that
competency includes at least a factual understanding of the illness and
treatment alternatives, including their risks and benefits, and the capacity
for rational decisionmaking. 01 The factual understanding standard is prob-
ably the one most commonly relied upon explicitly in statutory and case
law.102 Most minor consent statutes require an understanding and appreci-
ation of the nature and consequences of treatment alternatives. 0 3
and Research, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY (Irving B. Weiner & Allen K. Hess
eds., 1987).
94. Meisel, supra note 84, at 443-44.
95. Id. at 445-46.
96. Id. at 447-48.
97. Id. at 449-50.
98. See Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 91, at 1638.
99. Roth et al., supra note 82, at 283; see also Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 87, at
1638; Harold I. Schwartz & Karen Blank, Shifting Competency During Hospitalization: A
Model for Informed Consent Decisions, 37 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1256 (1986).
100. Roth et al., supra note 82, at 283.
101. Kaser-Boyd et al., supra note 62, at 411.
102. Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 91, at 1635-36.
103. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-9-602(7) (Michie 1991) ("[a]ny unemancipated minor
of sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical
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C. State Consent Laws for Minors
Traditionally, at common law, minors were incapable of providing
consentY14 Legislatures, however, have enacted statutes allowing "mature
minors" to consent to certain treatments. Consent laws for minors relating
to mental health treatment are generally of five types: "emancipated minor"
laws; "mature minor" laws; "age of consent to medical treatment" laws;
"age of consent to voluntary commitment" laws; and "age of consent to
outpatient treatment" laws. 05 Often, these categories overlap or coexist.
Emancipated minor laws allow minors to give consent for certain
enumerated treatments. State statutes define emancipation differently, but
generally the concept applies to children who live on their own away from
home, who are married, who have a child, or who are financially self-
sufficient.106 Mature minor laws allow children with a certain level of
maturity to give consent; courts have discretion to determine whether the
child has the decisionmaking maturity to give consent for the matter in
question. (In states without mature minor statutes, minors can frequently
be adjudicated "mature" at common law.) Maturity is more likely to be
found when the child is near majority and in situations where the court
feels that allowing the child to decide will best serve the child's interests.'0
7
For this reason, courts may be reluctant to find juveniles to be "mature"
when their parents seek their commitment, because of the assumption that
parents in this situation act in the child's best interests. Age of consent
laws, either to medical treatment generally or to voluntary commitment or
outpatient treatment, simply stipulate a certain age requirement, usually
twelve to fifteen, for minors to give legal consent. Some statutes combine
a minimum age requirement for consent along with a mature or emancipated
minor provision. 0
or medical treatment or procedures" can provide consent) (emphasis added); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 129.030(2) (1991) (stating that minor may consent who "understands the nature and purpose
of the proposed examination or treatment and its probable outcome, and voluntarily requests
it") (emphasis added).
Note, however, that although the statutory language includes the terms "appreciation"
and "understand," it is not clear what interpretation the legislatures intended for these terms.
See, e.g., Wynn v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (stating that "[w]e have
greater difficulty with the judicial inquiry into the minor's comprehension of the conse-
quences.... Do these consequences include only those which are physical and emotional or
psychological? Or ... do they include social, ethnic, spiritual and family or parental conse-
quences?").
104. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 114-17
(5th ed. 1984).
105. See FAY A. RozovsKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GuiDE (2d ed. 1990),
for a comprehensive review of state consent laws.
106. Id. § 5.2.3, at 266.
107. STANDARDS RELATINo TO RIGHTS OF MINORS Part II, § 2.1 commentary at 23-24
(Institute of Judicial Admin.-ABA Joint Comm. on Juvenile Justice Standards 1980).
108. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 25.9 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990) (stating that minor may
consent "who has attained the age of 12 years who ... is mature enough to participate
intelligently") (emphasis added).
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V. LEGAL STANDARDS AND PRESUMPTIONS FOR DETERmINING A MINOR'S
CAPACITY TO CONSENT: SoME NEW PROPOSALS
"The law does not view competence as inherent in the person, but
rather as something with which one is vested by society."' 9
A. General Approach
Although children may be capable of providing informed consent and
the beneficial effects of allowing them to do so may be significant under
appropriate circumstances, empowering children in this way involves more
than simply a scientific determination that children are competent." 0 Com-
mentators point out that even though children may be fully competent to
consent, social policy considerations might dictate that we distinguish be-
tween actual competence (de facto) and legal competence (de jure)."'
Reasons frequently cited for not extending to children the right to decide
include the child's relative lack of life experiences necessary for fully formed
values and sound judgment," 2 the child's inability to manage adult respon-
sibilities,"3 reluctance to require a child to bear responsibilities of adult
decisionmaking," 4 the desire to avoid the family disruption caused by parent-
child legal conflicts, reluctance to limit or undermine parental authority," 5
and the difficulty of determining competence on a case-by-case basis. My
perspective, however, is that the child should be allowed to provide informed
consent wherever possible. Allowing children to consent enhances treatment
efficacy and protects the child's rights. Children must be allowed to partic-
ipate in treatment decisionmaking because parents do not always act in a
child's best interest. In the mental health context, child-parent or parent-
child-state conflicts A.re very common," 6 making it necessary that the child
be given a voice in decisions affecting him or her. Allowing the child to
participate in treatment decisionmaking through informed consent helps
protect the child's interests, ensuring fundamental fairness. Adults and
109. Willard Gaylin, The Competence of Children: No Longer All or None, HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 33, 35 (Apr. 1982).
110. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGirSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYsTEm 22-24 (2d ed.
1981) (in contrasting social scientific [psychology, specifically] with legal modes of analyses,
states that "law is doctrinal; psychology is empirical" and that "law functions by the case
method, psychology by the experimental method").
111. See, e.g., Gaylin, supra note 109, at 38.
112. Id. at 34.
113. See, e.g., W.sTmAN, supra note 8, at 250.
114. See, e.g., Nancy S. Ehrenreich & Gary B. Melton, Ethical and Legal Issues in the
Treatment of Children, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY, 1285, 1300 (C. Eugene
Walker & Michael C. Roberts eds., 1983).
115. John D. Goetz, Note, Children's Rights Under the Burger Court: Concern for the
Child but Deference to Authority, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1214, 1228 (1985).
116. For a review of such conflicts, see Thomas S. Szasz, Critical Reflections on Child
Psychiatry, I CHILDREN & YouT SERV. REv. 7 (1979).
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children are to be afforded due process protections, although the nature of
due process may differ somewhat for children versus adults." 7 At a mini-
mum, due process includes notice and an opportunity to be heard.""
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child has adopted
the position that children be allowed to express their views in proceedings
affecting them." 9 (The United States, however, is not yet a signatory to the
Convention.)' 20 Article 12, sections 1 and 2 state:
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming
his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all
matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the
opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceed-
ings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative
or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural
rules of national law. (emphasis added).'
2'
The Convention duly recognizes, however, that the weight given to the
child's views and preferences must vary according to the child's age and
maturity, and contains numerous references to the "evolving capacities of
the child." Article 5 states that parents should "provide, in a manner
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction
and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized," suggesting
perhaps a shared decisionmaking approach between children and their
parents. 122
Of course, many would argue that the parents alone should decide on
treatment for their children. However, it is the child and not the adult who
is faced with a possible deprivation of liberty in the cases of civil commit-
117. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971) (holding that due
process standard for children is simply "fundamental fairness," which does not require a jury
trial in delinquency proceedings).
Other cases also illustrate the fact that while children enjoy constitutional rights, In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967), children's rights are not always coextensive with those of adults,
see, e.g., Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968); Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682
(1986).
118. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (stating that "[tihe fundamental requisite
of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard").
119. G.A. Res. 44/25, U.S. GAOR 3d Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda Item 108, at 8, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989), revised by U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25/Corr.I (1990), reprinted in
28 I.L.M. 1456 (1989).
120. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1992); see also Lawrence L. Stentzel,
Prospects for United States Ratification of The Convention on the Rights of the Child, 48
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285 (1991).
121. G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 119, at 13, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1461.
122. Gary B. Melton, Socialization in the Global Community: Respect for the Dignity of
Children, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 66, 69 (1991).
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ment and psychopharmacological treatment, and possible intrusion on pri-
vacy in the context of outpatient psychotherapy.
The perspective of this paper is that state laws regarding a minor's
ability to provide informed consent should differ depending upon the type
of mental health treatment. Additionally, adult authority should be circum-
scribed by the child's age; an adult's right to veto a child's treatment
decisions should decrease as the child grows older. Research suggests that
the decisionmaking competency of children differs as a function of age,
with critical age ranges appearing to be early (eleven to fourteen years) and
late adolescence (fifteen and over).2
Although all children should be allowed to participate in treatment
decisionmaking to the extent commensurate with their competence, 24 the
threshold issue of principal legal significance is whether the minor can
provide informed consent.' 25 This paper will present some new proposals,
based on recent research findings in psychology, for allowing minors to
consent to mental health treatment. First, however, it is necessary to define
what is meant by "competence" to consent. This is not a simple task.
B. Legal Standards
In many states, minors can consent to treatment only upon a showing
that they are "emancipated" or "mature.' '1 26 Emancipation is determined
largely by factors other than competency. The following discussion concerns
a minor's capacity to consent, pursuant to the "mature minor" paradigm.
Unlike mentally disabled adults, who are presumed competent to con-
sent, 27 nondisabled minors seeking to give consent pursuant to a mature
minor statute must make an affirmative showing of competence.' The
capacity of a child is also more open to question than that of an adult;
courts generally are deferential to parental wishes. 28 Courts may therefore
require a thorough demonstration of capacity on the part of the child before
being willing to override or bypass parental authority. 29
123. See infra notes 172-85 and accompanying text.
124. Citing empirical evidence regarding beneficial effects of preparing children for psy-
chotherapy, one commentator notes that limited informed consent may be possible with children
as young as six. Koocher, supra note 3, at 121. When individuals such as young children are
capable of participating in treatment decisionmaking but not able to provide full informed
consent, the term "assent" is commonly used. See, e.g., Sanford L. Leiken, Minors' Assent
or Dissent to Medical Treatment, 102 J. PEDIATRICS 169 (1983).
125. Note that allowing a child to provide informed consent should not preclude the child
from exercising the option to have his or her parents help the child make the decision. Professor
Weithorn suggests this may be the best alternative in most cases, facilitating parent-child
cooperation and problem-solving. Weithorn, supra note 76, at 253-54.
126. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
127. See infra note 313 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
602 (1979); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
129. The Supreme Court has not articulated any standards for determining whether a
minor is mature. See generally Katherine M. Waters, Note, Judicial Consent to Abort: Assessing
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These considerations suggest that the legal standard for defining capacity
should be one which includes all elements of competence. Therefore, the
"reasonable decisionmaking" standard, which is generally understood to
require (1) factual understanding, (2) rational decisionmaking, and (3) ability
to make and communicate a choice, should be applied to juveniles. The
child must understand the right to consent or not to consent to treatment.
Treatment concepts which the child must understand will vary according to
the proposed treatment, but the child should be able to (1) weigh risks and
benefits of each treatment alternative; (2) weigh the probabilities of treat-
ment success; and (3) provide reasoning to support each decision.
Additionally, the juvenile should demonstrate "appreciation"-an un-
derstanding of the relationship of various treatment options to one's own
values and the ability to draw inferences as related to the particular situation.
Commentators have also pointed out the importance of "good judgment,"
which includes emotional components such as the ability to regulate impulses
and to use and process information in an emotionally mature manner,
particularly under the taxing circumstances often present when deciding
important treatment issues. 30
These criteria require rational decisionmaking capacity, but do not
require that the decisionmaking process or choice be logical in all respects;
such a standard would be impossible to meet even for adults. Research
demonstrates that adult decisionmaking is subject to many cognitive biases
which defy logic.' A seemingly irrational decision made by a rational
individual does not, therefore, indicate legal incapacity,3 2 even if that
individual suffers from a mental illness.' Additionally, even adults typically
will not demonstrate perfect competence, 3 4 with most adult patients showing
a Minor's Maturity, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 90 (1985). The Court has simply said that the
judge's decisionmaking will "reflect personal and societal values and mores," Belotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 655-56 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring), and that the determination in the
abortion context is to be on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 644 n.23.
Similarly, the case law of state and federal courts provides no clear guidance on the
matter. Reported cases that have dealt with the issue reflect difficulty or ambivalence in
interpreting statutory language. See Waters, supra. While the question arises frequently in the
abortion context, there are very few opinions on point because of the constitutional requirement
that such proceedings remain confidential. See Belotti, 443 U.S. at 644 n.23. Courts do not
typically publish these opinions in the official reporters.
130. Allan M. Tepper & Florence W. Kaslow, Informed Decision-Making Capacity: A
Patient's Ability to Participate in Treatment Determinations, 6 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 49, 52
(1981).
131. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEuIsTcs AND BIASES (Daniel Kah-
nemann et al. eds., 1982); Daniel Kahnemann & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames,
39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984).
132. See RozovsKY, supra note 105, at 21-22.
133. But see Joanne Lynn, Informed Consent: An Overview, 1 BEHAv. Scis & L. 29, 35
(1983) (asserting that "[s]ome decisions [may be] so unreasonable that they are evidence per
se of incompetence").
134. See, e.g., Stanley, supra note 93, at 71 (noting that review of research indicates that
adult patients' comprehension of disclosure information varies from about 35% to 80% of
information they are told).
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only mid-level competence. 3 The relevant issue is not whether children are
capable of completely rational and competent decisionmaking in all respects.
Rather, "we must ask what capacities adults use to exercise their rights,"1 36
and then determine whether children have similar capabilities.
Thus, although children should be assessed on all the relevant compe-
tence standards, this does not imply that the child must evidence perfect
competence relative to each standard. Whether or not the child is deemed
to possess sufficient capacity will depend upon the treatment and legal
issues involved, and the judgment of the evaluator. 37
C. Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court has in fact applied different standards depending
upon the treatment in question. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth,"" the Court held that minors must be able to bypass parental
consent in order independently to obtain an abortion, if a court finds the
minor to be capable of mature decisionmaking regarding the abortion, or
if a court decides the abortion to be in the child's best interests. In contrast,
the Court has not upheld a mature minor's right to provide informed
consent in the civil commitment context, where significant liberty interests
are implicated and where the risk of harm from an erroneous decision may
be just as great. Additionally, parental choice should not necessarily be
preferred in civil commitment cases, in which it has been well documented
that parents do not always act in the child's best interest. 39 In Parham v.
J.R.,14° however, the Court held that a child may be civilly committed if a
physician independently concurs with the parents that the child requires
admission; all that is required is a physician's co-signature.
Thus, although the Court felt that a competent minor's privacy rights
outweighed parental rights in the area of abortion, it did not feel that a
minor's liberty interests outweighed the rights of the parents in the civil
commitment context.141 The Parham Court seems to have considered the
"mentally ill" child facing commitment to be incompetent. The Court also
135. Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 87, at 1637.
136. HOWARD CoHEN, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN (1980).
137. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
138. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
139. See supra notes 8-10, 15-26 and accompanying text.
140. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
141. One commentator also notes that the Court appears more willing to grant minors
decisionmaking rights when the child is seeking to consent to treatment (as with abortion)
than when the minor is seeking to refuse treatment (as commitment). Weithorn, supra note
76, at 250. Another commentator argues that the Court simply wants to limit the role of
judges in managing mental health services or institutions. "The immediate future of psychiatric
concerns before the Court ... is likely to hinge on the justices' perceptions of the proper role
of the judiciary in a society increasingly dependent on specialized groups possessed of specialized
skills. Judges' roles, not psychiatrists' roles, are what are really at stake." Paul Appelbaum,
The Supreme Court Looks at Psychiatry, 141 Am. J. PsYcHIATRY 827, 834 (1984).
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placed great reliance on medical judgment, 142 holding that lack of judicial
review is constitutional insofar as the determination is made by a "neutral
physician.'
1 43
This deference to professional judgment may explain the apparent
inconsistency between the decisions allowing minors to seek abortions with-
out parental notification, and the Parham decision denying the right to
consent to or refuse civil commitment. 44 In the cases of both abortion and
civil commitment, the Court appears to rely ultimately upon the judgment
of the professional. 145 As discussed earlier, however, professional judgement
in the mental health context may be relatively unreliable and not completely
"neutral," particularly when only one clinician makes the determination.' 4
In the Parham decision, in its exercise of judicial notice (citing the
"pages of human experience" 147 and "common human experience' 148), 149
the majority made "no fewer than fifteen empirical assumptions, many of
them directly contrary to existing social science research."'' 0 Empirical
142. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 611 (1979). Compare this decision, however, to the
Court's opinion in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, reh'g denied, 442 U.S. 887 (1979). In
Michael C., the Court held that a probation officer could not waive Miranda rights on behalf
of a child under his supervision. Id. at 724. Irene M. Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights
of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA
L. Rav. 656, 698-99 (1980). This apparent discrepancy between the two decisions perhaps is
explained by the fact that the Parham children were allegedly "mentally ill," therefore deemed
incapable of mature decisionmaking.
143. Parham, 442 U.S. at 606-07.
144. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Foreword: The Meanings of the Rights of Children, 10 N.M. L.
REv. 235, 251 (1980).
145. See Parham, 442 U.S. 584, 608 ("What is best for a child is an individual medical
decision that must be left to the judgment of physicians in each case").
146. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
147. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
148. Id. at 609.
149. One author notes with concern the layman's willingness to rely upon one's own
experience in making psychological judgments:
There is probably no topic in connection with which the average layman is more
ready to pronounce a judgment or express an opinion than that of psychology. We
may be content to leave the intricacies of physics or chemistry or any other of the
fundamental natural sciences to experts in these fields ... [but] [w]e are all under
the necessity of acquiring and pressing into service a workable set of conceptions of
human nature. Moreover, the materials with which psychology attempts to come to
grips are immediately available in the form of our own thoughts and feelings and
in the actions of others. We come readily to generalize from our experiences and to
develop a set of beliefs concerning the operation of the human mind. The demand
for working principles is so insistent that it is not surprising that hasty convictions,
half-truths, even superstitions become lodged in our mental constitutions and some-
times are modified or expelled only with the greatest difficulty .... In fact, unless
we turn the searchlight of self-criticism upon these beliefs we may go on indefinitely,
trusting our crude observations, never pausing to draw into question the processes
whereby we form our prejudices and set up our standards.
FRANK GELDARD, THE HUMAN SENSES 1-2 (1953) (emphasis added).
150. Perry & Melton, supra note 8, at 635.
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evidence refutes the assumptions that interests of the parents and child
coincide, that children are not "dumped" into hospitals, that psychiatric
hospitals are generally well-staffed and provide quality care, that children
and family relationships will be harmed by an adversarial hearing, and that
procedural safeguards do not decrease the incidence of inappropriate ad-
missions. 51
If bypass procedures are provided to minors in the abortion context
because of the privacy interests and potential harm involved, judicial review
and bypass should also be available in the mental health context. (The
dissent in Parham similarly suggested that Planned Parenthood, which
afforded mature minors a right to make abortion decisions, should con-
trol.' 52) Bypass procedures may be necessary to protect the child's rights
because parents often may not act in the child's best interests' 53 and also
because one clinician should not determine suitability for commitment, given
the relatively unreliable nature of psychiatric diagnosis'5 4 when measured
against legal standards5 5 and potential conflicts of interest. 56 Moreover,
findings of mental illness or need for commitment are legal rather than
medical conclusions.
5 7
In any case, it is clear that the Court has applied different standards
for allowing minors to participate in treatment decisionmaking depending
upon the Court's balancing of parental rights, rights of the child, and the
potential harm. Legal presumptions regarding the capacity of an individual
child unilaterally to provide a legally valid consent, that is, one that is
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, should differ depending upon (1) the
child's age, (2) the type of treatment, and (3) who seeks to have the child
treated. This approach is generally consistent with current legal practice,
where courts weigh the child's age, the potential for harm of a bad decision,
and the type of treatment, in determining whether the minor is sufficiently
"mature"'' 5  to consent to treatment.
151. Id. at 634 n.8; see also REDDING, supra note 38.
152. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 631 (1979).
153. See supra notes 8-26 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also John E. Helzer et al., Reliability
of Psychiatric Diagnosis II: The Test-Retest Reliability of Diagnostic Classification, 34 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 136 (1977).
155. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring)
("There can be little responsible debate regarding the uncertainties of [psychiatric] diagnosis
... and the tentativeness of professional judgment."); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429
(1979) ("Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a
serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an
individual is both mentally ill and ... dangerous.") (explaining rationale for applying lower
"clear and convincing" evidentiary standard in civil commitment cases).
156. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
157. "Mental illness" is a legal label insofar as many state commitment statues require
that the individual be "mentally ill" and "dangerous," and that the "dangerousness" be due
to the mental illness. A legal determination must be made in moving from a diagnosis or
behavioral description to a finding of "mentally ill" under the relevant statute.
158. Rozovsky, supra note 105, at 265-66.
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VI. PROPOSED STATUTORY SCHEME
A. Statutory Presumptions
"It would be wiser to approach the child in quest of competency,
rather than by presuming incompetence." 1S9
The statutory scheme outlined below represents guidelines for determin-
ing, either at common law or under a mature minor statute, whether a
minor is mature enough to provide consent. Many states allow minors to
consent to certain enumerated mental health treatments if the minor is
deemed to be "mature." Other than defining in broad terms what is meant
by maturity-for example, whether the minor can "understand and appre-
ciate the consequences of the proposed treatment" 16-these laws provide
no guidance on how actually to determine if a particular child is mature.
The proposed statutory scheme is designed to meet this need. The statutory
scheme could also be used to enact new state statutes or to reform age of
consent-mature minor laws.
Absent clear and convincing evidence 61 either of capacity' 62 (which
would rebut a presumption of incompetence) or incapacity (which would
rebut a presumption of competence), the following legal presumptions would
operate for guiding the clinician's initial determination of "maturity" as
well as a judge's determination, if there is judicial review. 63 The statutory
presumptions regarding a minor's capacity to consent are specified for each
type of treatment, with presumptions differing within each age group.'6
Presumptions also differ depending upon who is seeking the treatment,
specifically, whether the child is independently seeking treatment or an adult
is seeking treatment for the child.
The statutory scheme is based upon a balancing approach that considers
the risks and benefits of the treatment, the competence of the child, the
legal rights afforded the consenting individual, the rights of the child, and
parental rights. One or more of these key factors may be especially relevant
159. Gerald P. Koocher, Competence to Consent: Psychotherapy, in CHILDREN'S COM-
PETENCE, supra note 3, at 125.
160. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 82-363(q) (Michie 1985) (defining maturity as ability
to "understand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed treatment").
161. The "clear and convincing" standard of proof is used in determining capacity, as
this is the legal standard most commonly required in competency proceedings, John Parry,
Incompetency, Guardianship, and Restoration, in TtE MENTALLY DisABLBD AND T=E LAW 369,
382 (Samuel J. Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985), and is the constitutionally required standard
of proof for civil commitment. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979).
162. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
163. Note that the term "consent" here refers to a child's voluntary consent either to
receive or to refuse treatment.
164. The proposed scheme suggests legal presumptions which should operate to determine
a minor's maturity, but they differ according to the age ranges specified, thus combining a
minimum age approach with a maturity or capacity approach.
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in a particular situation, and one factor may be controlling or of greater
importance than the others (indicated in bold):
I. VOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT
A. Age 15 and over
1. If state law requires child's consent for voluntary commitment,
it should be presumed that the child is not competent to
consent. This triggers involuntary commitment procedures in
most cases that provide for judicial review.
Effect: Child cannot be committed without judicial review,
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the child is
psychologically competent to consent to voluntary commitment,
and the child does so.
Key factors:
Age: Children may have difficulty giving voluntary consent at
this age, given the treatment.
Treatment: Potentially very risky, with few advantages over
other types of treatment.
Parent v. child: Parent may seek commitment for the child
and coerce the child to consent.
2. If state law does not require child's consent for voluntary
commitment, the child can provide consent. This provides the
child with the possibility of participating in the decision.
Effect: The parent can have the child commited without his or
her consent and without any judicial review. However, by
voluntarily consenting, the child can exercise the right indepen-
dently to seek discharge and petition for judicial review, 165 or
refuse certain medical treatments while in the hospital.
Key factors:
Treatment: Potentially very risky, with few advantages over
other types of treatment.
B. Age 11-14
1. If state law requires child's consent for voluntary commitment,
the child cannot provide consent.
Effect: Child cannot be committed without judicial review.
Key factors:
165. See, e.g., N.M. gTAT. ANN. § 43-1-16(c) (Michie 1978):
To have a minor voluntarily admitted for residential treatment in a residential
program for a mental disorder, the minor and his parent or guardian shall knowingly
and voluntarily execute, prior to admission, a minor's voluntary consent to admission
document. The document shall include a clear statement of the minor's right to
voluntarily consent or refuse to consent to his admission, his right to request an
immediate discharge from the residential treatment program at any time and his
rights should he request a discharge and his physician, certified psychologist or the
director of the residential treatment facility determines the minor needs continued
treatment. Each statement shall be clearly explained, and each statement shall be
initialed by the minor and his parent or guardian.
(emphasis added).
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Age: Children of this age probably will not be able to resist
coercive pressures, and thus will be unable to provide voluntary
consent.
Treatment: Potentially very risky, with few advantages over
other types of treatment.
Parents v. child: Parent may seek commitment for child and
coerce child to consent.
2. If state law does not require child's consent for voluntary
commitment, the child can provide consent.
Effect: The parent can have the child commited without his or
her consent and without any judicial review. However, by
voluntarily consenting, the child can exercise the right indepen-
dently to seek discharge and petition for judicial review, or
refuse certain medical treatments while in the hospital.
Key factors:
Treatment: Potentially very risky, with few advantages over
other types of treatment.
C. Under 11
1. If state law requires child's consent for voluntary commitment,
the child cannot provide consent.
Effect: Child cannot be commited without judicial review.
Key factors:
Age: Children at this age will not be able to resist coercive
pressures.
Treatment: Potentially very risky, with few advantages over
other types of treatment.
Parents v. child: Parent may seek commitment for child and
coerce child to consent.
2. If state law does not require child's consent for voluntary
commitment, the child can provide consent.
Effect: The parent can have the child committed without his
or her consent and without any judicial review. However, by
voluntarily consenting, the child can exercise the right indepen-
dently to seek discharge and petition for judicial review, or
refuse certain medical treatments while in the hospital.
Key factors:
Treatment: Potentially very risky, with few advantages over
other types of treatment.
H. OUTPATIENT PSYCHOTHERAPY
A. Age 15 and over
1. When sought by the child: The child can provide consent.
Effect: A child can unilaterally seek and receive treatment,
even when the child's psychological competence to consent may
be questionable. 16
166. Allowing children of questionable competence to seek treatment effectively gives
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Key factors:
Age: Children 15 and over are psychologically competent.
Personhood: Even if competency is questionabl6, children of
this age should be allowed independently to seek this form of
treatment, out of respect for their "personhood."
Treatment: Entails relatively few risks and potentially great
benefits.
Privacy: Adolescents might not seek treatment if no guarantee
of confidentiality.
2. When sought by the parent or guardian: It should be presumed
that the child is competent to consent.
Effect: A child can refuse treatment against a parent's wishes,
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the child is
psychologically incompetent to do so.
Key factors:
Age: Children 15 and over generally are psychologically com-
petent.
Treatment: Entails relatively few risks and potentially great
benefits.
Parents v. child: Parents often may seek therapy for their child
when the child needs it but does not want it. Because of the
relatively few risks entailed, a child should not be able to veto
the parent's consent when the child's competence clearly is
questionable.
B. Age 11-14
1. When sought by the child: It should be presumed that the child
is competent to consent.
Effect: A child can unilaterally seek and receive treatment,
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the child is
psychologically incompetent to do so.
Key factors:
Age: Many children at this age are likely to be psychologically
competent.
Treatment: Entails relatively few risks and potentially great
benefits.
Privacy: Adolescents might not seek treatment if no guarantee
of confidentiality.
2. When sought by the parent or guardian: It should be presumed
that the child is not competent to consent.
children at this age the same right to seek treatment as adults. Adults are presumed legally
competent generally, and not just in certain limited contexts, as with minors. Adults who are
cognitively incompetent are routinely allowed to provide consent, out of respect for their
"personhood" as adults. With children, however, questions of psychological competency
frequently arise even when laws allow "mature" minors to consent and even when the minor
appears relatively competent. But see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (holding that
consent obtained from patient not competent to provide consent for voluntary commitment to
state hospital violates due process rights, giving rise to civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1981).
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Effect: A child cannot refuse treatment against the parent's
wishes, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the
child is competent to do so.
Key factors:
Treatment: Entails relatively few risks and potentially great
benefits.
Parents v. child: Parents often may seek therapy for their child
when the child needs it but does not want it. Because of the
relatively few risks entailed, a child should not be able to veto
the parent's consent, unless he or she clearly is competent to
do so.
C. Under 11
1. When sought by the child: It should be presumed that the child
is not competent to consent.
Effect: A child cannot independently consent to treatment
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the child is
competent to do so.
Key factors:
Age: Most children under the age of 11 are generally not
psychologically competent.
2. When sought by the parent or guardian: The child cannot
provide consent.
Effect: A child cannot refuse treatment against the parent's
wishes.
Key factors:
Age: Most children under the age of 11 are generally not
psychologically competent.
Treatment: Entails relatively few risks and potentially great
benefits.
Parents v. child: Parents often may seek therapy for their child
when the child needs it but does not want it. Because of the
relatively few risks entailed, a young child should not be able
to override parental wishes that the child receive treatment.
I. OUTPATIENT PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION 167
A. Age 15 and over
It should be presumed that the child is competent to consent.
Effect: A child can refuse treatment against a parent's wishes,
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the child is
psychologically incompetent to do so.
Key factors:
Age: Children 15 and over generally are psychologically competent.
Treatment: Potentially quite risky, but does not entail same cur-
tailment of liberty as does civil commitment.
167. The author is assuming that a child would not independently seek this type of
treatment, as in the case of outpatient psychotherapy.
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Parents v. child: Parents may seek such treatment for the child,
using it as an easy mechanism of behavior control.
B. Age 11-14
It should be presumed that the child is not competent to consent.
Effect: A child cannot refuse treatment against a parent's wishes,
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the child is
psychologically competent to do so.
Key factors:
Treatment: Potentially quite risky, but does not entail same cur-
tailment of liberty as does civil commitment.
Parents v. child: Parents may seek such treatment for the child,
using it as an easy mechanism of behavior control. Often, however,
parents may seek treatment for their child when the child needs it
but does not want it. Because the treatment does not involve the
same liberty interests as civil commitment and because it may be
very effective, a child should not be able to veto the parents'
consent unless clearly competent to do so.
C. Under 11
It should be presumed that the child is not competent to consent.
Effect: A child cannot refuse treatment against a parent's wishes,
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the child is
psychologically competent to do so.
Key factors:
Treatment: Potentially quite risky, but does not entail same cur-
tailment of liberty as does civil commitment.
Parents v. child: Parents may seek such treatment for the child,
using it as a- mechanism of behavior control. Often, however,
parents may seek therapy for their child when the child needs it
but does not want it. Because the treatment does not involve the
same liberty interests as civil commitment and because it may be
very effective, a child should not be able to veto the parent's
consent unless clearly competent to do so.
Several considerations guided the formulation of the stated presumptions
(see the Appendix for proposed model statutes), derived from a balancing
of factors.68 These factors-age and type of treatment (and who seeks the
treatment)-are discussed below.
B. Age
"It is easy to tell when an individual is eighteen; it is hard to know
when an individual is mature."'
6 9
168. Hart points out that children's rights advocates fall into one of three camps: those
who favor giving children adult rights; those who favor giving children adult rights if empirically
shown to be competent to exercise such rights; and those who weigh paternalistic concerns
against the benefits of choice in deciding what rights to extend to children. Hart, supra note
43, at 56. The proposed statutory scheme utilizes the second approach primarily, but also
includes elements of the balancing approach.
169. Gaylin, supra note 109, at 33.
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Age-related presumptions should be based upon current scientific evi-
dence on children's abilities at various ages. First, it is important to note
that there is variability in how children's abilities develop and change,
°70
with some children being below or above the relative age-norm.17, Age-
related presumptions, therefore, should be rebuttable, allowing a child of
any age to consent if capacity can be clearly demonstrated. For reasons
discussed below, civil commitment of minors under the age of fifteen would
be the one exception.
There appear to be important differences in children's competence
among definable age ranges, beginning with pre-adolescence (below age
eleven), followed by early adolescence (ages eleven through fourteen), and
late adolescence (fifteen and older). The age ranges correspond very roughly
to the concrete-operational (pre-adolescence) and formal operational stages
of cognitive development a la Piagetian stage theory. 72
Age 15 andAbove. Regardless of the standard of capacity used, research
shows that by the age of about fourteen or fifteen, most children will
demonstrate full adult competence. 7  For this reason, the general presump-
tion is that children fifteen and over are capable of providing informed
consent. 74 Children at this age can hypothesize about future events and
consider long-term consequences, weigh multiple factors simultaneously in
170. When considering scientific evidence on children's abilities, it should also be noted
that since most current research on children's competence to participate in treatment decision-
making has been with reference to white, middle class populations, applying such findings to
other ethnic and socioeconomic groups should be done with caution, Weithorn & Campbell,
supra note 62, at 1596. Research suggests that children from lower socio-economic groups
may be somewhat slower in their development of moral reasoning, Gary B. Melton, Teaching
Children About Their Rights [hereinafter Melton, Teaching Children], in THE RIGHTs OF
CHILDREN: LEO AND PSYCHOLEGAL PERSPECTIVES 163-66 (James S. Henning ed., 1982), and
are less likely to understand how they can exercise their rights. Gary B. Melton, Children's
Concepts of Their Rights, 9 J. CLINCAL CHID PSYCHOL. 186 (1980) [hereinafter Melton,
Children's Concepts].
171. See generally Rachel Gelman & Rende Baillargeon, A Review of Some Piagetian
Concepts, in 3 MUSSEN's HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY: COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT (John
H. Flavell & Ellen M. Markman eds., 1983); JoHN H. FLAVELL, COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT (2d
ed. 1985).
172. For a summary of children's understandings and abilities at various ages based upon
a Piagetian approach, see Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors Concent to Treatment: A
Developmental Perspective, PROF. PSYCHOL., Aug. 1978, at 412; REDDING, supra note 38;
Judith V. Torney, Socialization of Attitudes Toward the Legal System, in LAW, JusTIcE, AND
THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 134 (June L. Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977); see also Roger
Bibace & Mary E. Walsh, Developmental Stages in Children's Concepts of Illness, in HEALTH
PSYCHOLOGY-A HANDBOOK (George C. Stone et al. eds., 1980).
173. See Grisso & Vierling, supra note 172, at 412; Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 62,
at 1596.
174. Although 14 is generally cited as the age by which most children are able to participate
fully in treatment decisionmaking, one well-designed and frequently cited study found that
while children 16 and older understood their legal rights as well as adults, children under 15
had significantly lower levels of understanding. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacity to Waive
Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. Rav. 1134 (1980).
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making a decision, understand probabilities, and fully understand the links
between actions and consequences. As a result, they generally will be able
to understand, appreciate, and evaluate the more abstract treatment and
legal concepts, 7s and understand how the vested interests of various profes-
sionals can affect the advice they give.
76
Ages 11 to 14. Children between the ages of ten or eleven and fourteen
often are capable of mature decisionmaking, but this depends greatly upon
situational factors and the complexity of the issues. 77 For example, twelve-
year-olds are able to define accurately relatively simple legal terms, for
example, witness, evidence, objection, but there is great variability between
children in their ability to define and understand more difficult legal terms,
for example, testify, charges, allegation. 78 For this reason, the general
presumption for children in this age range is that they are probably capable
of providing informed consent. Because the capacity of a child at this age
is much more uncertain, however, the presumptions for this group err on
the side of caution, framed in terms of what best protects the child's legal
due process rights.
Below Age 11. Below the age of about eleven, research suggests that
most children are not capable of providing informed consent. Because
younger children have difficulty in imagining circumstances that differ from
prior experience, in understanding abstract concepts, and in thinking hy-
pothetically, they may not be able to understand long-term risks and benefits
or the right to consent or refuse to consent. 79 Nine-year-olds, for instance,
appear to have a minimally adequate factual understanding of treatment
risks and benefits' 0 and of the differences between various diagnoses and
prognoses;' but they often lack appreciation of the practical significance
of their legal rights'8 2 and have difficulty in evaluating treatment risks,
benefits, and alternatives.' 3 Additionally, younger children are especially
175. Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 62, at 1590.
176. Catherine C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decision: Changes Over Grades
Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, 52 CHILD DEV. 538 (1981) (finding significant increase
in tendency to seek second opinion between grades seven and twelve).
177. See generally CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE, supra note 3; Gardner et al., supra note 58;
Grisso & Vierling, supra note 172; Lewis, supra note 176.
178. Saywitz et al., supra note 70, at 527-29. For a developmental theory of children's
understanding of legal rights and the legal system, see LAw, JusTIcE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN
SocmETy, supra note 172. For empirical research on children's understanding of the legal
system, see Karen Saywitz, Children's Conceptions of the Legal System: "Court is a Place to
Play Basketball, " in PERSPEcTrvES ON CHILDREN'S TESnMONY 131 (S.J. Ceci et al. eds., 1989);
Amye Warren-Leubecker et al., What Do Children Know About the Legal System and When
Do They Know It? First Steps Down a Less Traveled Path in Child Witness Research, in
PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY, supra, at 158.
179. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 176.
180. Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 62.
181. Roberts et al., supra note 69.
182. Ronald W. Belter & Thomas Grisso, Children's Recognition of Rights Violations in
Counseling, 15 PROF. PSYCHOL. RFs. & PRACTICE 899, 900 (1984).
183. Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 62.
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susceptible to coercive pressures from authority figures' 4 and base their
decisionmaking upon the desire to avoid punishment or criticism. 85 These
factors make it difficult for them to provide truly voluntary consent.
Thus, the general presumption for children below age eleven is that
they will not be able to provide informed consent. However, because some
children will have the capacity to provide consent in certain contexts, the
presumptions are not conclusive, except for civil commitment, discussed
below, and therefore may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
This approach is consistent with the view that maturation is a process that
develops at different rates for different individuals; there is no arbitrary
boundary between the incompetent child and the competent child or adult.'8 6
C. Type of Treatment
"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent .... The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."'' 17
A particularly important consideration is the potential harm likely to
result either from an erroneous determination of competence or from an
erroneous treatment decision by the child. In large measure, the degree of
danger is a function of the type of treatment at issue and who seeks the
treatment.'
Voluntary Civil Commitment. Civil commitment to a mental institution,
even for a short time period, constitutes a "massive curtailment of lib-
erty." 9 Given this fact, the law should discourage the inpatient treatment
of children as a matter of public policy.' 90 While commitment may be the
best dispositional alternative for a small percentage of children for whom
184. Thomas J. Berndt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and Parents, 15
DEV. PSYCHOL. 608 (1979); Gerald P. Koocher, Children Under the Law: The Paradigm of
Consent, in REFORKI G THE LAW, supra note 58, at 3, 6.
185. See LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SociETY, supra note 172.
186. See ZIMEING, supra note 45, at 103-04.
187. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
188. The issue of who is seeking treatment involves the distinction between the right to
choose for oneself versus the right to be free from the decisions of others. Andrew J. Kleinfield,
The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents, and the State, 4, 5 FAm. L.Q. 320-49,
410-43, 64-107 (1970, 1971).
189. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972). But see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 624 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I can perceive no basic constitutional differences
between commitment to a mental hospital and other parental decisions that result in a child's
loss of liberty").
190. Melton, supra note 122, at 69 (interpreting Preamble, Articles 9 and 25, and other
provisions of U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child as implying a presumption against
residential placement). The Preamble states that children should "grow up in a family
environment." Article 9 provides for judicial review when a child is placed outside the home,
and Article 25 provides for periodic judicial review following institutionalization.
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it is sought, 191 it is not so for the great majority. 92 A large percentage of
hospitalized youth are inappropriately placed, 93 as they are simply delin-
quent or difficult to handle 94 and do not have severe disabilities. 95 United
States Senator Daniel Inouye stated that "our traditional emphasis on
inpatient care may be inappropriate and even detrimental for many mentally
disturbed children. A large percentage of children placed in hospitals either
never should have been admitted to the institution or remain too long."' 96
Many commentators have noted with concern the very dramatic increase
over the last decade in the inpatient treatment of children. 197 Reasons for
this increase may include a lack of adequate community mental health
services and an increase in profit-making children's psychiatric hospitals. 19
191. AM. ACAD. OF CHMD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCmATRY, CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSY-
CmATRIc ILLNESS: GuIDEs FOR TREATmNT RESoURcEs, QUALrrY ASSURANCE, PEER REVIEW
AND REm uR USENr (1987) (commitment is alternative of last resort, appropriately restricted
to children who are dangerous or who exhibit severe functional impairment).
192. The appropriateness of involuntary civil commitment remains highly controversial
within the legal, medical, and mental health professions. John Parry, Civil Commitment: Three
Proposalsfor Change, 10 MENTAL DisAm uzr L. REP. 334 (1986). Recognizing the questionable
effectiveness of inpatient treatment, the liberty interest of the patients, and the frequency of
inappropriate placement, some advocate the complete abolition of involuntary commitment.
See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Com-
mitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REv. 54 (1982); Thomas S. Szasz, Involuntary
Mental Hospitalization: A Crime Against Humanity, in IDEOLOGY AND INSANrrY: ESSAYS ON
THE PSYCHIATRIC DEHUMANIZATION OF MAN 113, 113-40 (1970). Others argue that the deinsti-
tutionalization movement has resulted in patients' not receiving needed care, see, e.g., H.
Richard Lamb & Mark J. Mills, Needed Changes in Law and Procedure for the Chronically
Mentally Ill, 37 HosP. & Com.muNrr PSYCHATRY 475 (1986), or being shunted into the criminal
justice system. Donald N. Haupt & Saundra M. Erlich, The Impact of a New State Commitment
Law on Psychiatric Patient Careers, 31 HosP. & CommuNrTy PSYCMATRY 745 (1980).
193. Emerging Trends in Mental Health Care for Adolescents: Hearing on H.R. 32, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Metz, supra note 10, at 22, 28 (reporting results of recent Children's
Defense Fund study finding that 40% or more of juvenile admissions to private psychiatric
hospitals are inappropriate, and that in 1988, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota found
that adolescents were hospitalized on average twice as long as was necessary); Lois A. Weithorn,
Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth, An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates,
40 STAN. L. REv. 773, 831-34 (1988).
194. Metz, supra note 10, at 22 (stating that because Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Act of 1974 discourages incarceration for status offenses, children who commit such offenses
are now often placed in psychiatric hospitals); PATRCIA GUTTIUDGE & CAROL A.B. WARREN,
Adolescent Psychiatric Hospitalization and Social Control, in MENTAL HEALTH AND CRuMA.L
JUSTCE 119, 119-22 (Linda A. Teplin ed., 1984).
195. The term "children with disabilities" is used rather than "mentally ill," to emphasize
that the term "mental illness" can be stigmatizing.
196. Daniel K. Inouye, Children's Mental Health Issues, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 813, 814
(1988).
197. See, e.g., Charles A. Kiesler & Celeste Simpkins, The De Facto National System of
Psychiatric Inpatient Care: Piecing Together the National Puzzle, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 579,
581-82 (1991) (documenting 87% increase between 1980 and 1985 in inpatient treatment of
children); Nina Darnton, Committed Youth, NEWswEEK, July 31, 1989, at 66; Weithorn, supra
note 193, at 783-84.
198. See Metz, supra note 10, at 28; Weithorn, supra note 193, at 816-20, 829-30.
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Such factors may bias clinicians' judgments regarding the suitability of
commitment'" and may be used to rationalize commitments which do not
meet statutory criteria. 200
Moreover, inpatient treatment may be of questionable efficacy even for
children with severe mental disabilities. 2 1 Community-based treatment is
often more effective than hospitalization, 202 since those receiving community-
based care generally have fewer symptoms and greater life satisfaction, 2 3
particularly as compared to institutionalized patients having similar or
identical diagoses and prognoses. The very significant potential negative
effects of psychiatric hospitalization, abuse of the commitment process by
parents and even clinicians, as well as problems of inappropriate admissions
because of frequent diagnostic and prognostic errors 2°4 by the admitting
clinician, have all been well documented.20 5 In spite of these concerns, under
the voluntary commitment procedures of many states, the child can be
committed indefinitely simply upon the parent's request and as long as a
clinician or facility director concurs, with no judicial review required upon
initial commitment. 6
These are all reasons to favor a presumption of incapacity in states
where a child's consent or assent is necessary for voluntary commitment. 207
199. See, e.g., Edward P. Mulvey & N. Dickson Reppucci, The Context of Clinical
Judgment: The Effect of Resource Availability on Judgments of Amenability to Treatment in
Juvenile Offenders, 16 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 525 (1988).
200. See, e.g., Charles D.H. Parry et al., Commitment and Recommitment: Shortcomings
in the Application of the Law, 9 DEVELOPMENTS IN MENTAL HEALTH L. 25 (1989) (noting that
as much as 55% of time, jurisdictions in Virginia do not comply with statutory requirement
that less restrictive treatment alternatives be explored).
201. See, e.g., Edward C. Hinckley & W. Frank Ellis, An Effective Alternative to
Residential Placement: Home-Based Services, 14 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 209 (1985);
Charles A. Kiesler, Mental Hospitals and Alternative Care: Noninstitutionalization as Potential
Public Policy for Mental Patients, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 349 (1982).
202. CARLsEs A. KIESLER & AMY E. SIBULN, MENTAL HosPITALIZATON: MYTHS
FACTS ABOUT A NATIONAL CISIS 152-80 (1987); Susan M. Barrow & Linda Gutwirth, Com-
munity Treatment as the Least Restrictive Alternative: Costs and Benefits, in PsYCHIATRIC
PATIENT RIGHTS AND PATIENT ADVOCACY 196, 196-205 (Bernard L. Bloom & Shirley J. Asher
eds., 1982).
203. Barriers to Health Care for the Mentally 11l: Hearings on S. 393 Before the Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
204. An older, but very famous study, found that hospital psychiatrists misdiagnosed
ostensibly "normal" individuals (who were actually "confederates" of the scientists conducting
the study) as mentally ill and in need of hospitalization. Even after they were admitted to the
hospital, the psychiatrists did not discover the diagnostic error. D. L. Rosenhan, On Being
Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973); see also Douglas A. Davis, On Being Detectably
Sane in Insane Places: Base Rates and Psychdiagnosis, 38 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 416 (1976).
205. For reviews, see REDDING, supra note 38; Weithorn, supra note 193. See also Perry
& Melton, supra note 8, at 648-60.
206. Under Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 616, 619 (1979), periodic institutional review
of the need for continuing confinement is required, however. The Court also intimated that
greater due process protections might be necessary for children who are committed as wards
of the state.
207. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-518 (1975 & Supp. 1989) (minors 14 and over
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Voluntary commitment, where the individual is coerced or threatened into
voluntarily consenting, is frequently used as a vehicle for avoiding the
hearing typically required for an involuntary commitment. 2°s Therefore, in
order to protect a child's due process rights,209 the presumption for children
fifteen and over should be that the child is not competent to consent
voluntarily. 210 This would trigger a judicial or administrative review 211 under
the involuntary commitment procedures of most states, 212 and thus possibly
provide the child the opportunity to express his or her views.
213
may be admitted for inpatient treatment only if application is signed by both minor and parent
or guardian); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.2 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992) (stating that if parent
requests admission for child and medical officer determines it is appropriate, but minor objects,
parent must petition juvenile court for approval); WA. REV. CODE. ANN. § 71.34.030 (West
1985 & Supp. 1992) (stating that to commit minor over age of 13 voluntarily, child must
provide written consent, and that once voluntarily admitted, minor has right to release upon
next judicial day, unless treatment facility files petition in-juvenile court).
208. See generally Samuel J. Brakel, Voluntary Admission, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND TnE LAW 177 (3d ed. 1985).
209. Article 9, § I of the United Nations Convention on Rights of the Child states in
part that "States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her
parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review deter-
mine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for
the best interests of the child." G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 119, at 12, reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
1460. Section 2 further provides that "In any proceedings pursuant to [section] 1, all interested
parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their views
known." Id.
210. The distinction between voluntary and involuntary commitment is important, but
often illusory. Voluntary patients can leave the hospital, while involuntary patients must seek
discharge through habeas corpus petition to the courts or at periodic institutional review
hearings. "Voluntary" admissions, however, are usually coerced under threat of involuntary
commitment, and juveniles who are voluntarily committed nevertheless often need parental
consent for discharge. See generally Ellis, supra note 32, at 845-48; Brakel, supra note 208.
211. A survey of 316 clinical psychologists found that most felt a patient's rights would
best be protected if a commitment decision were made by an independent review board
consisting of lawyers and clinicians not associated with the case or the institution. Lynn R.
Kahle & Bruce D. Sales, Attitudes of Clinical Psychologists Toward Involuntary Civil Com-
mitment Law, PROF. PSYCHOL. 428, 433-34 (1978).
212. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-112(4) (1989 & Supp. 1991) (if minor age 16
or over does not consent to commitment, involuntary commitment procedures are automatically
triggered). It should be noted that in the case of the adult respondent, there are disadvantages
to being committed involuntarily. A voluntary adult patient can sign him- or herself out of
the hospital upon giving notice. Although some state statutes provide that minors can consent
to voluntary commitment and can also voluntarily sign out of the hospital, few expressly allow
for the latter. Contra, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-112(3) (1989 & Supp. 1991) (minor
who applied for admission may request discharge on own behalf); W. VA. CODE § 27-4-1
(1986). Even where the child is able to voluntarily seek discharge, it is unlikely that a child
would independently seek to do so, or that continued commitment would not then be sought
under the involuntary commitment procedures. But see Melville v. Sabbatino, 313 A.2d 886
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1973) (17-year-old minor petitions for release under voluntary admission
statute despite parental objections).
213. It should be noted that in some states, the right to judicial review under the
involuntary commitment procedures applies only to state institutions, not private psychiatric
hospitals. This is consistent with the principle that constitutional due process concerns need
attach only when there is some state action involved.
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One study which presented children with a hypothetical situation con-
cerning a child suffering depression, and treatment, options found that
while none of the twenty-one-year-olds and only sixteen percent of the
fourteen-year-olds preferred inpatient over outpatient or no treatment, fifty
percent of the nine-year-olds chose inpatient commitment. The researchers
speculated that this is due to the dependency typical of younger children.
214
For this reason, as well as the uncertainty surrounding their competence to
provide informed consent, children below the age of fifteen should not be
allowed to consent to voluntary commitment.
However, the presumptions should differ when state law does not require
the child's consent or assent for voluntary commitment. 2 5 Such laws allow
parents to commit their child without the child's consent and without any
initial judicial review. Given this, a child's refusal to consent would not
trigger the involuntary commitment procedures that require judicial review.
Allowing the child to consent under these circumstances, however, may have
some potential benefits once the child is hospitalized. In many states, when
the child consents to voluntary commitment, he or she can independently
seek discharge 16 or refuse certain inpatient treatments.
Outpatient Psychotherapy. Outpatient psychotherapy or counseling raises
quite different concerns than does inpatient commitment. First, it is a much
less restrictive alternative. 217 Second, there is no significant deprivation of
liberty, although significant privacy interests are involved. Third, while few
children capable of mature decisionmaking desire commitment, 218 troubled
youths do voluntarily seek out counseling services. 2 9 Children seeking treat-
ment without parental involvement can be served at government-funded
community mental health centers, which will typically charge the minor
either a nominal fee or no fee. Even if the child is only marginally
competent, the benefits of allowing a child unilaterally to seek outpatient
therapy may be substantial.220 Many states, for example, allow minors as
214. Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 62, at 1596.
215. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.30.690 (1990).
216. See supra note 212.
217. It should be noted that involuntary outpatient commitment has received increasing
attention recently as an alternative to civil commitment. As court-ordered outpatient treatment,
it typically requires lower standards of proof and includes more expansive eligibility criteria
than does inpatient commitment. See generally Edward P. Mulvey et al., The Promise and
Peril of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIsT 571 (1987).
218. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
219. See Melton, supra note 79, at 34; Gary B. Melton, Effects of a State Law Permitting
Minors to Consent to Psychotherapy, 12 PROF. PsYcHoL. 647 (1981) [hereinafter Melton,
Effects of a State Law].
220. Psychotherapy is not risk-free, however. Some have argued that even verbal psycho-
therapy can sometimes have serious iatrogenic effects, including a deterioration in the symptoms
or functioning in a small percentage of patients, due to the stress of therapy or changes in
behavior, affect, or attitude induced by the therapy. This so-called "deterioration effect" has
been found in a number of studies. See, e.g., Allen E. Bergin, The Evaluation of Therapeutic
Outcomes, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND BEHAVIOR CHANoE 217 (Allen E. Bergin &
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young as twelve independently to seek treatment for substance abuse221 or
venereal disease 22 because of the strong policy interests in promoting health
in these areas. 2 3 Six to eight million children have a mental health problem
requiring treatment, but fewer than one-half receive treatment.
224
There are similar important policy interests in encouraging children in
need to seek therapy. One way to do this is to protect their privacy in the
therapeutic relationship by allowing them independently to seek outpatient
treatment. Research has shown that even very young children value their
privacy.? In fact, data suggests that adolescents may be more likely to
seek therapy if their privacy was protected by a policy of not notifying
their parents.2 6
Courts have recognized the very personal nature of psychotherapy,
22 7
and requiring parental consent may be countertherapeutic in a variety of
Sol L. Garfield eds., 1971) (reviewing over thirty studies which found a deterioration effect);
Suzanne W. Hadley & Hans H. Strupp, Contemporary Views of Negative Effects in Psycho-
therapy, 33 ARCH. GEN. PsYCHIATRY 1291 (1976). "Critics for psychotherapy have long
recognized that psychotherapy has the potential for harm as well as for cure and that '[t]herapy
may lead one into health, but it may also be a part of the complex process that ends up
driving one crazy,"' BARRY R. Fusuow, MALPRACTICE IN PSYCHOTHERaPY 9 (1980) (citing
Bergin, supra, at 251). Some have also questioned the effectiveness of psychotherapy. See,
e.g., Martin L. Gross, Tr PSYCHOLOGICAL SoCIETY (1978). But see Mary L. Smith & Gene
V. Glass, Meta-Analysis of Psychotherapy Outcome Studies, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 752 (1977)
(analysis of 400 studies, finding that most patients are helped by therapy). The child may also
suffer lifelong stigma and employment discrimination if the psychotherapy results in a psy-
chiatric record or a psychiatric diagnosis, particularly in the case of serious mental illness.
Catherine E. Rosen et al., The Stigma of Patienthood, in PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT RIGHTS AND
PArmTET ADVOCACY, supra note 38, at 59-82.
221. See generally RozovsKY, supra note 105, § 5.7, at 301-04. States which require
parental notification for treatment for drug and alcohol abuse may be in violation of federal
law, 21 U.S.C. § 1175. See generally JAMrEs M. MORRISSEY ET AL., CONSENT AND CONFIDEN-
TIALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 76-82 (1986).
.222. RozovsKY, supra note 105, § 5.4, at 275-76.
223. Koocher, supra note 60, at 15.
224. Leonard Saxe et al., Children's Mental Health: The Gap Between What We Know
and What We Do, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 800 (1988).
225. See generally Maxine Wolfe, Childhood and Privacy, in 3 HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND
ENVmOINT: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 175-222 (Irwin Altman & Joachim F.
WohIwill eds., 1978); Ross D. Parke & Douglas B. Sawin, Children's Privacy in the Home:
Developmental, Ecological, and Child-Rearing Determinants, 11 ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAV. 87
(1979).
226. Melton, supra note 79, at 34.
227. Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ("Psychotherapy probes
the core of the patient's personality. The patient's most intimate thoughts and emotions are
exposed during the course of the treatment .... The psychiatric patient confides [in his
therapist] more utterly than anyone else in the world.... [H]e lays bare his entire self, his
dreams, his fantasies, his sin, and his shame") (quoting MANLFRED S. GUTTMACHER & HENRY
WEINHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND Trm LAw 272 (1952)); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064,
1071-72 (9th Cir. 1976) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) ("[t]he possibility that the psychotherapist
could be compelled to reveal those communications to anyone ... can deter persons from
seeking needed treatment and destroy treatment in progress") (citing JAY KATZ ET AL.,
PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY, AND LAW 726-27 (1967).
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respects. One survey of forty-one community mental health clinics in Virginia
found that the most common problems of children who independently
sought treatment were family problems including abuse (twenty-nine per-
cent), drug and alcohol abuse (twenty-seven percent) and sexual matters
including pregnancy and incest (twenty-four percent). 22s Requiring parental
consent may deter the child from seeking treatment, particularly concerning
these types of problems. It may also intensify family conflict and stress, 2 9
or in some cases even result in greater psychological problems for the child
if parents reject the child's plea for help or become overly intrusive in his
or her affairs. One commentator notes, however, that minors who seek
therapy independently may be the very ones with parents most likely to sue
a therapist if they do learn that their child is undergoing treatment. 230
Because constitutional privacy rights may be implicated in the therapist-
patient relationship, allowing a child independently to consent to outpatient
therapy may have a constitutional basis. First Amendment rights are also
potentially implicated in allowing children independently to seek treatment. 231
Verbal therapies arguably entail First Amendment freedom of speech. More-
over, an untreated mental illness may impair freedom of thought, just as
involuntary treatment may. 2 For this reason, several state and federal
courts have found a constitutional right independently to seek to control
one's mental health treatment.23 Moreover, in Whalen v. Roe,2"4 the United
States Supreme Court identified two distinct privacy interests grounded in
the Fourteenth Amendment: avoiding disclosure of personal confidential
matters, and individual autonomy in decisionmaking involving fundamental
rights. 23 Allowing children to provide unilateral informed consent protects
228. Melton, Effects of a State Law, supra note 219, at 652.
229. See Peter Freilberg, Parental-notification Laws Termed Harmful, APA MoNrroR,
Mar. 1991, at 28 (citing recent testimony to Congress by Jeanne Marecek, chairwoman of
psychology department at Swarthmore College, discussing laws requiring minors to obtain
parental notification to obtain abortion).
230. John E.B. Myers, Legal Issues Surrounding Psychotherapy with Minor Clients, 10
CLINICAL Soc. WoRK J. 303, 308 (1982) (arguing that "parents unable or unwilling to
communicate effectively with their troubled child may be the very ones most readily to seek
redress against the therapist for 'interfering').
231. Of course, children's First Amendment rights are generally more limited than those
of adults. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
232. Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d 1201, 1212-13 (7th Cir. 1989) (Cudahy, J., concurring)
("Freedom of thought is intimately touched upon by any regulation of procedures affecting
thought and feelings .... [T]he state has put procedural and substantive obstacles in the path
of those who both need and desire certain forms of treatment, and in that way their freedom
of thought remains impaired because they cannot get treatment.. . .") (citing Aden v. Younger,
57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 679-80 (1976), concerning state statute restricting electroconvulsive
therapy and psychosurgery).
233. Shields, 874 F.2d at 1212-13, 178 Cal. App. 3d 90 (1986).
234. 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
235. Id. But see Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175-77 (5th Cir. 1981) (commenting that
privacy interest in confidentiality is broader than privacy interest in autonomous decisionmaking
because latter is limited to fundamental rights involving family privacy).
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both privacy interestsY 6 Several courts have held that these privacy rights
extend to the relationship between psychiatrist and patient. 7 Preserving the
confidentiality and privacy of this special relationship recognizes the per-
sonhood of children,238 and courts have recognized doctor-patient privilege
when the patient was a minor.239 Some would argue, however, that parents
also should have certain basic rights, including the right to be informed
when their child is receiving treatment or to be involved in such treatment.
For these reasons, and also because outpatient treatment does not
involve a deprivation of liberty, as does inpatient commitment, it is suggested
that children ages fifteen and over be given the unqualified right to consent
unilaterally to outpatient treatment on an unlimited basis or, refuse treat-
ment if therapy is requested by the parent. Since it appears that therapists
often treat minors without parental consent, the proposed law simply
conforms to widespread clinical practice.2 l The Pediatric Bill of Rights,
236. Although the right to privacy has been extended to minors, it has been circumscribed.
See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977). The Court stated that
State restrictions inhibiting privacy rights of minors are valid only if they serve any
significant state interest ... that is not present in the case of an adult. This test is
apparently less rigorous than the 'compelling state interest' test applied to restrictions
on the privacy rights of adults. Such lesser scrutiny is appropriate both because of
the States' greater latitude to regulate the conduct of children, and because the right
of privacy implicated here is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions, and the law has generally regarded minors as having a lesser
capability for making important decisions.
Id.
237. See, e.g., Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1038-39 (D.
Haw. 1979) ("No area could be more deserving of protection than communications between
a psychiatrist and ... patient .... Privacy extends to an individual's liberty to make decisions
regarding psychiatric care without unjustified governmental interference"); Caesar v. Moun-
tanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067 n.9 (9th Cir. 1976) ("right of privacy.., extends to psychotherapist-
patient communications"); Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 569-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
But see Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d 1201, 1209-11 (7th Cir. 1989) (privacy right does not
necessarily protect the decision to seek psychotherapy); Boruchi v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848
(1st Cir. 1987).
238. See AmERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL AssocIATIoN, Ethical Principles, Principle 5: Confi-
dentiality, § d (1985) ("When working with minors ... psychologists take special care to
protect these persons' best interests.").
239. See Roberts v. Superior Court, 508 P.2d 309 (Cal. 1973).
240. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 25.9 (West 1982) ("Consent of the parents is not
required but the professional shall attempt to involve the minor's parents unless such involve-
ment would be inappropriate." (providing that mature minors 12 and over may consent to
outpatient treatment if a victim of incest or abuse, or dangerous to self or others)).
241. One survey of 41 community mental health clinics in Virginia found that many clinics
treated minors without parental consent or notification well before a law was passed providing
children with this right, and only about 12% notified the parents. (This is consistent with a
much older survey showing that about 75% of mental health services in Massachusetts treated
adolescents without parental consent). About 20% of the clinics, however, try to determine
the reasons why the child does not want parental involvement, and about 29% limit the
number of sessions which the child can attend without notifying parents. Melton, Effects of
a State Law, supra note 219; see also JoHN P. WLsoN, THE RiGHTS OF ADOLESCENTS IN THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYsTEM (1978).
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promulgated by the National Association of the Children's Hospital, pro-
vides that "[elvery person, regardless of age, shall have the right to seek
out and receive psychiatric care and counseling.' '242 The Juvenile Justice
Standards promulgated by the American Bar Association suggest that minors
fourteen and older be allowed to consent to outpatient treatment, but only
for three sessions, for the limited purposes of crisis intervention or diag-
nosis. 243 Currently, however, only New Mexico and Virginia allow children
of any age the unqualified right unilaterally to consent to outpatient
psychotherapy without parental notification.2" For children between eleven
and fourteen, the presumption should be that the child is competent to
consent, if the child unilaterally and voluntarily seeks treatment.
When treatment is sought by the parent on behalf of the child, however,
the presumption should be that the child is not competent to consent, that
is, unable to refuse treatment against parental wishes.245 This presumption
avoids placing undue obstacles on obtaining treatment for children who
need it. Undue obstacles should be avoided with older children, also, but
because of the compelling evidence of their competence, the age factor
should control. Thus, older children should be presumed competent, whereas
younger children should be presumed incompetent, or not allowed to provide
consent when treatment is sought by the parent.
Indeed, a key consideration of the Parham Court was to avoid placing
obstacles in the way of needed commitment. Because of the very significant
liberty interest involved in civil commitment, the child's best interests are
promoted when some obstacles are placed in the road to commitment-it
should not be easy to institutionalize a child. There are no compelling
reasons, however, for placing procedural obstacles in the way of outpatient
care. 24 Children's interests would seem to be best served when they are
allowed to seek outpatient treatment when they feel they need it, but not
generally afforded the absolute right to refuse it241 when parents feel they
242. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE CHILDREN'S HosPITAL, PEDATRIC BiLL OF RIcHTs,
Canon V (1974).
243. Standards Relating to Rights of Minors Part IV, § 4.9 (Institute of Judicial Admin-
istration-ABA Joint Comm'n on Juvenile Justice Standards (1980)).
244. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-17A (Michie 1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969(D)(4)
(Michie 1991); see also N.Y. MENTAL HYo. LAW § 33.21 (McKinney 1988) (providing that
minors may consent to outpatient treatment if the treatment is necessary and notifying the
parents would be detrimental to treatment). But see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.110 (Vernon 1988)
(expressly stipulating that person must be 18 to consent to outpatient treatment).
245. Note, however, that one survey of community mental health clinics found that the
child's case was dropped about 46% of the time when the child refused to consent, even
though his parents had requested treatment for the child. Melton, Effect of a State Law, supra
note 219, at 651.
246. In cases where both the parent and child refuse to consent but treatment is considered
necessary by the school, the Education for all Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. 94-142
(1975), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (1988), can be used to ensure treatment is provided. Schools
must provide mental health services to children who require-it.
247. This is not merely a speculative concern; one study found that almost one-third of
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need treatment,m except for those fifteen and older, because their compe-
tency is that of an adult.
Outpatient Psychotropic Medication. While the issue of an adult's right
to refuse medication in the context of civil or criminal commitment has
received a good deal of attention lately,249 scant attention has been given to
the right of a juvenile to refuse psychotropic medication on an outpatient
basis. 0
Although their side effects can be significant, medications given on an
outpatient basis generally are not as confining to the individual as is
institutionalization.- 1 Additionally, outpatient psychopharmacological treat-
ment can be very effective and is often used to maintain the patient in
order to avoid commitment or readmission. 2 Unlike civil commitment,
antipsychotic medication may arguably be the "single most effective treat-
ment for psychosis.
' 2. 3
On the other hand, there can also be serious long-term side effects from
the prolonged use of such drugs.2 4 Many psychotropic medications represent
a restrictive treatment alternative because of their restraining and mind-
altering effects. 5 While some side effects are mild, others are debilitating
minors refused treatment when given the choice. Linda Taylor et al., Exploring Minors'
Reluctance and Dissatisfaction With Psychotherapy, 16 PROF. PSYCHOL.: REs. & PRACTICE 418
(1985).
248. This illustrates the important distinction between a child's consent to treatment when
there is no parental consent or notification, and a child's consent without parental consent
but with parental notification. While the former may present fewer constitutional concerns,
the latter approach may be more appealing to legislators and their constituents.
249. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Paul S. Appelbaum, The
Right to Refuse Treatment with Antipsychotic Medications: Retrospect and Prospect, 145 AM.
J. PsYCmATRY 413 (1988); Franklin J. Hickman et al., Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medi-
cation: An Interdisciplinary Proposal, 6 MENrA Dis~amrry L. REP. 122 (1982).
250. Antipsychotic drugs most commonly used include Haldol, Mellaril, Navane, Com-
pazine, Prolixin, and Thorazine. Amicus Curiae Brief of American Psychological Association
at 6, n. 11, Washington v. Harper (No. 88-599) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]; see also PuYsici Ni's
DESK REFERENCE (46th ed. 1992), at 1373 (Haldol), 2011 (Mellaril), 1954 (Navane), 2201
(Compazine), 1793 (Prolixin), and 2234 (Thorazine).
251. See Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. Appelbaum,' "Mind Control, " "Synthetic Sanity,"
"Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic
Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. Ray. 77, 88 (1983).
252. Id.; Amicus Brief, supra note 250; John M. Kane, Treatment of Schizophrenia, 13
SCmZOPHRENA BuLL. 133, 142-43 (1987); Lucy D. Ozarin et al., A Quarter Century of
Psychiatric Care 1950-1974: A Statistical Review, 27 Hosp. & COMmuNITY PSYCmATRY 515
(1976).
253. Jorge Veliz & William S. James, Medicine Court: Rogers in Practice, 144 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 62, 63 (1986).
254. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S.
291, 293 n.1 (1982); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 752 n.13 (D.C. 1979); Rennie v. Klein, 462
F. Supp. 1131, 1138 (D.N.J. 1978), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en
banc), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, aff'd and remanded, 720
F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc); see generally Amicus Brief, supra note 250.
255. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Washington
Supreme Court properly equated the intrusiveness of this mind altering drug treatment with
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or even deadly.2Y6 Some commentators have also argued that antipsychotic
drugs are frequently used indiscriminately simply to control problem behav-
iors rather than to treat mental illness .2 7 This argument is more commonly
made with reference to inpatients, however. 2 s Indiscriminate use of medi-
cation is less likely to occur in outpatient treatment because there are not
the pressures inherent in understaffed institutions to use medication simply
to control patient behavior or as a substitute for psychotherapy, 2 9 and also
because the treating psychiatrist is likely to be better qualified.2
On balance, then, the case of outpatient medication perhaps is best
viewed as involving liberty interests midway between inpatient commitment
26'
and outpatient psychotherapy. 262 Given this, older children should be pre-
sumed competent to consent, whereas younger children (under age fifteen)
should be presumed incompetent to consent. Effectively, this allows older
children the right to refuse treatment against parental wishes unless clearly
electroconvulsive therapy or psychosurgery .... "); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 936
(N.D. Ohio 1980) ("These drugs quite often cause pain and serious, long-term, if not
permanent, side effects. They deaden the patient's ability to think and their forced adminis-
tration is an affront to basic concepts of human dignity."). But see State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d
1379 (N.H. 1978) ("[M]edication has a beneficial effect on the defendant's ability to func-
tion ... ."); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 660 (lst Cir. 1980) ("The record also shows that
in many situations, despite the risks of harmful side effects, the administration of drugs to
an individual is clearly in his best interests because of the beneficial effects. .. ").
256. See Dilip V. Jeste et al., The Biology and Experimental Treatment of Tardive
Dyskinesia and Other Related Movement Disorders, in 8 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
536, 537-38 (Philip A. Berger & Keith H. Brodie eds., 2d ed. 1986). One common side effect
is tardive dyskinesia, which causes uncontrolled muscle movement in the face, arms, and legs,
and other serious medical complications. Id.
257. See, e.g., JOSEPH T. SMITH, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: PSYCHIATRIC CARE § 5.17, 5-1
app. (1986 & Supp. 1988); ROBERT I. SIMON, CLINICAL PsYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 60-74 (1986);
C. Thomas Gualtieri et al., Tardive Dyskinesia Litigation and the Dilemmas of Neuroleptic
Treatment, 14 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 187 (1986).
258. But see J. Larry Brown & Stephen R. Bing, Drugging Children: Child Abuse by
Professionals, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS (Gerald P. Koocher
ed., 1976); Colburn-Rohn, supra note 13, at 6-8 (using drug treatment for hyperactivity as
example, arguing that outpatient drug treatment is also subject to misuse, with parents and
teachers having interest in expeditious and improved behavioral management and physician
wanting to provide treatment).
259. See Elizabeth Symonds, Mental Patients' Rights to Refuse Drugs: Involuntary Med-
ication as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 HAsTINGs CoNsT. L.Q. 701, 702 (1980).
260. Commentators have noted that many of the psychiatrists at state institutions are
poorly qualified. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 192, at 81-82; Perry & Melton, supra note 8,
at 656-57.
261. At least -one court has equated the involuntary administration of psychotropic
medication on an outpatient basis with involuntary civil commitment. Guardianship of Roe,
421 N.E.2d 40, 51 (Mass. 1981).
262. Even in cases where the child is committed for involuntary outpatient treatment, this
alone should not be dispositive of the child's competence to refuse antipsychotic medications
during the course of such therapy. By statute or at common law in most states, neither
involuntary commitment (whether inpatient or outpatient) nor mental illness implies incom-
petence to participate in decisionmaking regarding the course of treatment. See infra notes
313-14 and accompanying text.
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incompetent to do so, but younger children would be able to override
parental wishes only if clearly competent.
VII. DETERMINING CAPACITY TO CONSENT
A. Who Should Decide?
The question of who has legal authority for making the determination
of capacity is an important issue in assessing a minor's maturity. Statutes
which allow mature minors to provide consent, but which also require
judicial review, suggest a role for judges in making the determination. Most
mature minor statutes, however, simply require that the minor be mature,
with the initial determination to be made by a physician, psychologist, or
admitting officer.
For a variety of reasons, it is preferable for a determination of maturity
to be made by an independent clinician. Clinicians have greater familiarity
with the child, have specialized training, and are likely to have more time
to make the determination than would a judge at an expedited proceeding.
Administrative convenience and judicial economy would also dictate mini-
mizing judicial involvement.
Determining a child's capacity to understand legal rights, make treatment
decisions, and provide informed consent is a difficult task involving psy-
chological and legal considerations. Ideally, an independent mental health
professional and attorney would work as a team in making the determina-
tion. The attorney would have responsibility for ensuring that legal rights
are accurately explained to the child and that the consent is legally valid,
whereas the clinician would assess the child's abilities. 263 Disclosure proce-
dures related to obtaining informed consent should be conducted by the
lawyer in the presence of the clinician. Clinicians can obtain valuable
information about the child's understanding and capacity by observing his
or her comments, questions, and emotional reactions.
264
Oftentimes, however, an attorney will not be readily available, so
clinicians should receive forensic training relating to minor consent laws
and standards. It is important to recognize that neither clinical nor legal
training alone is sufficient to enable a professional to determine capacity
to provide informed consent.2 65 Determining a child's capacity to provide a
legally valid informed consent requires specialized knowledge in areas such
as children's cognitive development, psychological assessment, and the rel-
263. See Thomas G. Gutheil et al., Participation in Competency Assessment and Treatment
Decisions: The Role of a Psychiatrist-Attorney Team, 11 MENTAL DIsABILiTY L. REP. 446
(1987) (presenting case study of effective collaboration between a psychiatrist and attorney in
determining competence to consent).
264. Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 87, at 1637.
265. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., COMmuNrTY MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS AND THE COURTS:
AN EVALUATiON OF COMMUNrrY-BASED FORENSIC SERVICES 44-45 (1985).
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evant legal standards to be applied. Ideally, the clinician performing the
evaluation would have training in these areas.
B. Informing Children
If children are to be allowed to provide informed consent to treatment,
we must ask what it means to inform a child. A legally valid consent must
be voluntary, knowing, and competent; the absence of any one of these
components invalidates the consent. 26 "Voluntary" means without coercion
or undue influence. Relatively complete information is essential to make a
"knowing" decision. The ability to make an "intelligent" decision is de-
termined by cognitive capacity. The same legal standards of voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent that are required for an adult's consent would
apply to children.
Commentators, however, point out that physicians generally fall ade-
quately to inform patients 267 of treatment alternatives and risks, 261 that
explanations of treatment options are presented in a manner designed to
convince the patient to follow the physician's recommendation, and that
physicians do not probe patients' understanding to ensure that their consent
is truly informed. 269 Because of these shortcomings, patients are seldom
given complete decisionmaking autonomy.270 In Planned Parenthood of
Missouri v. Danforth, for example, Justice Stewart noted with concern the
fact that the minor seeking the abortion received only perfunctory counseling
at the clinic regarding the abortion procedure. 27 While evidence regarding
possible harmful psychological effects of full disclosure is still somewhat
266. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 46, at 74-79; John Parry, Decision-
Making Rights Over Persons and Property, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 435,
448-49 (Samuel J. Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985).
267. Failure to inform patients of risks may be partly due to the historical tradition within
the medical professions of emphasizing paternalism and treatment over patient autonomy. See
Martin S. Pernick, The Patient's Role in Medical Decisionmaking: A Social History of Informed
Consent in Medical Therapy, in 3 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Making Health Care Decisions: The
Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient Practitioner Relationship,
Apps., Studies on the Foundations of Informed Concent 1-35 (1982) [hereinafter PREsIDENT's
STUDY].
268. But see Elizabeth Loftus & James F. Fries, Informed Consent May Be Hazardous
to Your Health, SCIENCE, Apr. 1979, at 1 (arguing that slight risks should not be routinely
disclosed due to the potentially harmful suggestive effects, similar to a "placebo effect").
269. See, e.g., Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decision-
making: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 379, 399-400, 423-
424 (1990); Charles W. Lidz & Allan Meisel, Informed Consent and the Structure of Medical
Care, in PRESIDENT'S STUDY, supra note 267, at App. C.
270. Marjorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected
Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 221 (1985).
271. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91-92 n.2 ("The coun-
seling ... occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be performed .... It lasts for two
hours and takes place in groups that include both minors and adults who are strangers to one
another.... The physician takes no part in this counseling process .. ").
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unclear, the growing consensus is that disclosure is seldom harmful and
frequently is beneficial. 272
If physicians do not adequately inform their adult patients about medical
procedures, it is unlikely that mental health professionals will do better
when informing their minor clients about the risks, benefits, and treatment
alternatives regarding mental health treatment.273 For instance, one study
found that only eight out of one hundred patients who voluntarily consented
to inpatient commitment had been adequately informed.274 This presents a
serious problem, since children will often require more extensive information
than adults if their consent is to be informed, as children have not had
much actual experience in exercising rights or in adult decisionmaking.
It may thus be necessary to use more elaborate consent procedures when
dealing with minors, 275 exercising special care to ensure that the child's
consent is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and that the child is adequately
informed. Young children are especially susceptible to coercive pressures
from adults,276 may feel that such pressures exist even when they do not,
and may tend to equate adult recommendations with the "right choice." 277
Children may also tend to confuse legal rights with privileges that are to
be exercised only at the pleasure of adults. 278 Care should be exercised to
determine that a decision is voluntary, 279 that it reflects the child's wishes
and independent judgment, and that the child appreciates the significance
of his or her legal rights. Routinely providing juveniles with legal counsel
or advice from a clinician who has had forensic training, in a private setting
away from the parents, 0 may help to accomplish this.
272. See Myron K. Denney et al., Informed Consent: Emotional Responses of Patients,
60 POSTGRADUATE MED. 205 (1975); Lynn, supra note 133, at 35.
273. Perhaps a less pessimistic view is warranted with regard to mental health professionals,
however. Ruth Macklin, a well-known biomedical ethicist, noted that specialists who must deal
regularly with a patient's emotional needs are generally more receptive to such ethical issues.
N.Y. Tnsas, Aug. 5, 1990, §6 (Magazine), at 64. But see infra note 312 and accompanying
text; supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
274. Grace B. Olin & Harry S. Olin, Informed Consent in Voluntary Mental Hospital
Admissions, 132 AM. J. PsYCmATRY 938 (1975).
275. Walter J. Wadlington, Consent to Medical Care for Minors, in CHILDREN'S COM-
PETENcE, supra note 3, at 66.
276. See Berndt, supra note 184; Koocher, supra note 60, at 10.
277. See Gary B. Melton, Children's Competence to Testify, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 73,
80 (1981).
278. Melton, Children's Concepts, supra note 170.
279. Some have suggested that, in the context of civil commitment, for instance, judicial
review should always be provided in order to determine the voluntariness of the child's consent.
Weithorn, supra note 193, at 834-35. Some state statutes include such provisions. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.465(1) (West 1986) (minors may consent to inpatient treatment provided
there is a hearing to determine voluntariness); FLA. STAT. ANN. §394.56(1) (minors twelve and
older may consent to outpatient treatment if there is a hearing to determine voluntariness).
An alternative method, perhaps preferable when the child voluntarily consents to treatment,
is simply to require the clinician or attorney to certify in good faith that the consent is
voluntary. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 32, at 906.
280. Similarly, some experts have urged that all juveniles facing delinquency charges be
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C. Ensuring Voluntariness
Even when a child is clearly capable of providing informed consent,
serious concerns with respect to the voluntariness of the decision must
sometimes be overcome. The 1982 President's Commission examining ethical
problems in medicine concluded that clinicians have an ethical duty to
ensure, to the extent possible, that patient decisionmaking is free of coer-
cion.?'
Voluntariness relates more closely to experience, maturity, and self-
efficacy than to cognitive capacity. 2 2 Given children's sensitivity to appear-
ances, social expectations, and peer pressures during adolescence, 283 as well
as their emotional and financial dependency upon parents, and inexperience
in adult decisionmaking, commentators have questioned whether a minor's
consent can ever be entirely free of coercion, persuasion, or manipulation. 2 4
Therefore, it is important to develop procedures to ensure voluntariness
which will emphasize to the child his or her rights and opportunity to
choose, and which will provide social and emotional support for the child
to do So.
28 5
Several recent studies286 provide encouraging, albeit preliminary, data
suggesting that fourteen- and fifteen-year-old adolescents are able to resist
coercive pressures from parents. These studies found that children's decisions
regarding various hypothetical treatment situations did not differ signifi-
cantly from those of adults. Interestingly, adolescents did not typically
challenge parental directives on relatively insignificant treatment decisions.
They were generally willing to do so only -in cases involving serious treatment
issues having serious consequences. This finding is also encouraging to those
who feel that providing children with decisionmaking power might result in
ongoing disruption of parent-child relationships.
Inexperience in making choices may make it difficult for children to
believe that they can participate meaningfully in treatment decisionmaking. 87
provided with a nonwaivable right to legal counsel. See Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault
Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REv. 146, 174 (1989).
281. PRESIDENT'S STUDY, supra note 267.
282. See, e.g., P. Kieth-Spiegel, Children and Consent to Participate in Research, in
CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE, supra note 3, at 194.
283. See, e.g., Grisso & Vierling, supra note 172, at 421-22.
284. See, e.g., Michael A. Grodin & Joel J. Alpert, Informed Consent and Pediatric
Care, in CMHLDREN'S COMPETENCE, supra note 3, at 93.
285. See, e.g., Grisso & Vierling, supra note 172, at 421 ("consent or dissent is a social
act").
286. David G. Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in Medical
Treatment Decisions, 15 L. & HUMAN BEHAv. 431 (1991); David G. Scherer & N. Dickson
Reppucci, Adolescents' Capacities to Provide Voluntary Informed Consent, 12 L. & HUMAN
BEHAv. 122 (1988).
287. Gary B. Melton, Decision Making by Children: Psychological Risks and Benefits, in
CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE, supra note 3, at 24-25; see also Charles W. Lidz et al., The Right
of Juveniles in "Voluntary" Psychiatric Commitments: Some Empirical Observations, 8 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCmATRY & L. 168, 172 (1984) (study of 15 committed juveniles between ages
of 13 and 17 found that none availed themselves of right to hearing under involuntary
commitment procedures because of their perception that court would not listen to them).
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Juveniles' inexperience in exercising legal rights may hinder their ability
actually to assert their rights, even though they may fully understand them,
28
and there is some research to support this. 29 Professor Grisso suggests that
rights be explained in a manner similar to the use of Miranda warnings:
inform the child of the right, explain the effects of waiving the right, and
ascertain if the child understands the right.290
D. Enhanced Consent Procedures
The result of enhanced procedures may be that children are actually
better informed than most adult patients, 29' which accords with the subjective
standard of informed consent292 and the "dual-maximal" approach. This
approach provides minors with all rights necessary to ensure fundamental
fairness, as well as any additional protections necessary to make the exercise
of their legal rights functionally equivalent to that of adults. 2 3 Since children
have less experience in treatment decisionmaking and in exercising legal
rights, enhanced consent procedures are necessary to ensure that they are
able to exercise rights in an adult manner.
Use of such enhanced procedures may also, paradoxically, require the
juvenile to demonstrate capacity to a greater extent than is typically required
of the adult because such procedures would extensively probe the child's
understanding. Yet, this is not inconsistent with the law: while adults are
presumed competent (an affirmative ruling of incompetence by the court is
generally necessary to deprive an adult of the right to provide informed
consent), 294 children must generally make an affirmative showing of com-
288. Melton, Teaching Children, supra note 170; Melton, Children's Concepts, supra note
170.
289. See, e.g., J. Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter, Interrogation of Juveniles: An
Empirical Study of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver 1 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 321
(1977).
290. Thomas Grisso, From Legal to Psychological Measurement, in JUVENILE'S WAIVER
OF RIorrs: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 41-59 (1981).
291. With adults, informed consent is generally judged by an objective, reasonable person
standard, rather than whether the particular patient actually understood. See, e.g., Canterbury
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780, n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("physician discharges the duty when he
makes a reasonable effort to convey sufficient information although the patient without fault
of the physician, may not fully grasp it"); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972). But
see AMEIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 238. The Ethical Principles state that:
When working with minors or other persons who are unable to give voluntary,
informed consent, psychologists take special care to protect the minors' best interests.
Within this context, even in states which clearly allow minors to seek treatment
independently, the clinician probably has an ethical duty to determine the actual
competence of the client to consent.
Id.
292. Under the subjective standard, adequacy of the disclosure depends upon the needs
of the patient and is judged on a case-by-case basis. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CmLDRESS,
supra note 46, at 90-91. With minors, the subjective standard may be more appropriate, given
the difficulty in knowing what a "reasonable child" would want to know at various ages.
293. Rosenberg, supra note 142, at 661-73.
294. See generally Parry, supra note 161.
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petence. While the statutory presumptions for minors proposed herein would
also extend the same "adult" presumption of competence to minors of
certain ages for outpatient therapy, presumptions of incompetence still
remain within this framework in order to protect the child's rights and
interests.
Use of enhanced consent procedures may also be necessary in order to
avoid potential tort liability or the overturning of capacity determinations
upon judicial review. 295 Although the execution of an informed consent
authorization by the patient generally gives rise to a presumption that the
patient's consent was legally valid296 (voluntary, knowing, intelligent), it is
possible that courts may be reluctant to extend such a presumption in the
case of a minor, due to the minor's inexperience and relatively unequal
bargaining power. As of 1986, there appears not to have been a single
reported case where a physician has been held liable for treating a minor
without informed consent. 297 Such cases might begin to occur, however,
where mental health professionals routinely provide treatment upon chil-
dren's unilateral consent but the informed consent procedures are inade-
quate. Perhaps clinicians who treat minors under a reasonable, good-faith
belief that the minor is capable of consenting should be immune from
liability against claims that the consent was invalid.
Finally, the value of informing children about prospective treatment,
even in cases where the child cannot provide consent, should not be
overlooked. In such cases, the minor should nevertheless be kept fully
informed and allowed to participate in treatment decisionmaking. Numerous
studies have found therapy to be more effective when the patient is allowed
to help plan or select his or her own treatment.
298
E. Practical Tests of Capacity
Although no generic model or test has yet been developed for assessing
capacity to give consent, various techniques have been used. 299 Most tests
developed to date have been used in research to measure the factual
understanding or appreciation components of competence and have been
295. If the therapist fails to inform the patient about the therapy and does not obtain
informed consent, or if disclosure is made but is inadequate, the therapist may be liable for
negligence. See generally RozovsKy, supra note 105, at 73-89, §§ 1.15, 1.16; BARRY R.
FuRtRow, MALPRACTICE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 66-70 (1980).
296. Jones, supra note 269, at 386-87. But see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990)
(holding that consent obtained from patient not competent to provide consent for voluntary
commitment to state hospital violates due process giving rise to civil rights claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1981).
297. MoRRIssEY ET AL., supra note 221, at 15.
298. William B. Janzen & William Love, Involving Adolescents as Active Participants in
Their Own Treatment Plans, 41 PSYCHOL. REPs. 931 (1977); G. Terence Wilson, Perceived
Control and the Theory and Practice of Behavior Therapy, in CONTROL AND PERCEIVED
CONTROL 175 (Lawrence C. Perlmutter & Richard A. Monty eds., 1979).
299. For general guidelines for assessing children, see REDDING, supra note 38, at 22-27.
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sufficiently validated for clinical use. Tests need to be developed which also
assess the rational decisionmaking aspect of competence, and validation
studies using large and diverse samples are needed. Any test of capacity
should be amenable to administration by lawyers as well as clinicians and
should be objectively reliable by scoring verbal responses directly related to
the treatment question. 300 Perhaps the most common and practical approach,
often used with adults in medical settings, has been simply to ask the client
to answer questions or provide explanations regarding treatment facts, risks
and benefits, and factors the client would consider in reaching a decision.30'
Variations on this approach have been used in research on children's
decisionmaking. A structured interview format, followed by specific probe
questions, is frequently used. These questions include asking the child what
he or she considered and thought about in the decision, with a point given
for each relevant factor considered;3°2 asking about the disadvantages of
therapy and what someone might discuss with a therapist, and scoring each
response based upon adequate, partial, or poor understanding; 303 or pre-
senting children with scenarios in which a right is violated, and asking the
child to explain what right was violated and how.3°4
Another approach is to ask the child to define the meanings of "risk"
and "benefit" by giving examples. 303 If the child is unable to do this, the
examiner does so. The child is then asked again to define the words and
give examples. Once the child demonstrates understanding, the proposed
treatment is explained. The child is then asked to identify all the possible
risks and benefits of the treatment. This approach is thus a means for
assessing the factual understanding and appreciation components of com-
petence, but it is a demanding test: the child must infer the risks and
benefits rather than simply paraphrase risks and benefits already explained.
Researchers have developed an assessment instrument to test factual
understanding for use after disclosure to the patient.3°6 The test, called
"MUD"-Measuring Understanding of Disclosure-includes three subtests,
called "uninterrupted disclosure," "single-unit disclosure," and "single-unit
recognition." The two disclosure subtests ask the individual questions,
requiring him or her to paraphrase information given in the disclosure;
questions are asked immediately following each paragraph in single-unit
disclosure. Thus, the single-unit subtest is somewhat less demanding. The
single-unit recognition subtest requires the individual to identify similar and
dissimilar statements.
300. See, e.g., Roth et al., supra note 82, at 280.
301. See, e.g., Robert Miller & Henry S. Willner, The Two-Part Consent Form: A
Suggestion for Promoting Free and Informed Consent, 290 NEw ENO. J. MED. 964 (1974).
302. Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 62, at 1592-93.
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., Belter & Grisso, supra note 182, at 902-03.
305. Kaser-Boyd et al., supra note 62, at 413.
306. Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Mentally Ill and Non-Mentally-ill Patients'
Abilities to Understand Informed Consent Disclosures for Medication, 15 L. & HUmAN BEHAY.
377, 379-81 (1991).
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Professor Grisso has developed an assessment instrument to test chil-
dren's factual understanding of legal rights. The child is shown drawings
of, for example, an attorney-client consultation or a courtroom scene. The
child is then asked to explain the scene in his or her own words, to define
relevant concepts, and to answer true-false questions about the legal rights
involved. 3°7 A "Waiver Expectancy Interview" was also developed to meas-
ure the child's expectations about the effects of waiving a right, given his
or her situation °s0 This would seem to measure appreciation-the effects
of a decision upon one's own situation.
Similar procedures could be used to determine a child's capacity to
consent to mental health treatment. In civil commitment, for instance, the
following facts should be explained to the child: reasons the commitment
was sought; less restrictive alternatives; benefits and risks of commitment;
conditions at the hospital; and what treatments are likely to be given at the
hospital. 3 9 The child could then be asked to explain each one of these facts
and how he or she might weigh them in making a decision. A test could
be given to determine if the child then understands the legal and practical
effects of consenting, or refusing to consent, to a particular mental health
treatment.
F. Assessing Competence
When informing children and assessing their understanding, use of age-
appropriate vocabulary and extensive probing into their understanding are
particularly important. Research shows that younger children will often
respond "yes" when asked if they know the meaning of a legal term, but
often think they understand because they have confused the legal term with
a familiar everyday term, for example, hearing or minor.310 Similarly,
competence may be underestimated if the child is required to know or
understand certain words, rather than simply the underlying concepts."'
307. Grisso, supra note 290, at 47-55.
308. Id. at 57, App. E.
309. See AsaicAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, A PATIENT'S BILL OF RIOS (1973). The
Patient's Bill of Rights states that:
The patient has the tight to obtain from his physician complete current information
concerning his diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis in terms the patient can be
reasonably expected to understand. When it is not medically advisable to give such
information to the patient, the information should be made available to an appro-
priate person in his behalf .... The patient has the right to receive from his
physician information necessary to give informed consent prior to the start of any
procedure and/or treatment. Except in emergencies, such information for informed
consent should include but not necessarily be limited to the specific procedure and/
or treatment, the medically significant risks involved, and the probable duration of
incapacitation. Where medically significant alternatives for care or treatment exist,
or when the patient requests information concerning medical alternatives, the patient
has the right to such information.
Id.
310. Saywitz et al., supra note 70.
311. REDDING, supra note 38, at 26.
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Thus, relatively deep probing into the child's responses and the use of
several different tests or testing methods are warranted. Additionally, it is
worthwhile to ensure that the child's decision is not simply a transient one
by asking the child about his or her choice at various points in time.
It was suggested in Part IV-B that a relatively demanding standard of
competence be used with children-one which includes all the potential
elements of competence: factual understanding, rational decisionmaking,
and the ability to make and communicate a choice. In assessing capacity,
it is necessary to relate the testing procedures and results obtained to the
relevant standard(s) of competence. This can pose problems, however. A
recent study found that psychiatrists have difficulty assessing competence
in terms of capacity standards. Surprisingly, psychiatrists did not assess
factual understanding in eighty-one percent of the cases, whereas the most
difficult test to meet-appreciation-was assessed the most frequently, in
eighty-six percent of the cases. This often resulted in underestimations of
capacity.
12
Regardless of how capacity is determined, there should be no presump-
tion that mental illness implies incompetence. This principle has been
recognized statutorily or in the case law of most states. 13 Second, capacity
should be viewed as an issue separate from the child's mental illness and
the treatment decision. 14 This may seem counterintuitive. However, even
children with disabilities are often cognitively competent to participate in
decisionmaking.
315
Competency should also not be viewed as static or unidimensional. A
growing body of research indicates that children's abilities do not develop
simultaneously, developing instead at different rates. 316 Thus, viewing a
312. Karen McKinnon et al., Rivers in Practice: Clinicians' Assessments of Patients'
Decision-Making Capacity, 40 Hosp. & CommuNrry PSYCHATRY 1159, 1161-62 (1989).
313. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 658-59 (1st Cir. 1980); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Boyd v. Bd. of Registrars of Voters of Belchertown, 334 N.E.2d
629 (Mass. 1975) ("profound" distinction between commitment and incompetency); Parry,
supra note 161, at 375.
314. Parry, supra note 161, at 375.
315. Although there have been few studies investigating the effects of various mental
illnesses upon decisionmaking competence, one recent study found mixed results when com-
paring hospitalized schizophrenics and major depressives with non-mentally ill hospitalized
patients. While on average the schizophrenic group showed significantly poorer understanding
of information about medication given during the course of informed consent procedures,
there was great variability between patients, with some demonstrating competence comparable
to the comparison group. The study also found that cognitive deficits tend to impair competence
more than do emotional problems. Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 306, at 385-87.
Several older studies have also found that schizophrenics did not differ significantly from
non mentally-ill patients in their ability to understand facts or weigh risks and benefits. See,
e.g., Lisa Grossman & Frank Summers, A Study of the Capacity of Schizophrenic Patients to
Give Informed Consent, 31 Hosp. & CoMMuNinr PsYCHiATRY 205 (1980); David A. Soskis,
Schizophrenic and Medical Inpatients as Informed Drug Consumers, 35 ARCH. OF GENEA
PsYcHiATRY 645 (1978); David A. Soskis & Richard L. Jaffe, Communicating with Patients
about Antipsychotic Drugs, 20 Com. PSYCHIATRY 126 (1979).
316. See generally FLAVELL, supra note 171; Gelman & Baillargeon, supra note 171.
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child's abilities in terms of an overall "competency" factor is misleading.
Rather, competency is domain-specific; children may be fully capable of
understanding and decisionmaking in some areas, partially capable or in-
capable in others. Indeed, the law recognizes that an individual can be
legally competent in some areas while incompetent in others.3 17 Any assess-
ment of competency should therefore focus on the specific cognitive skills
required to provide informed consent for the particular treatment in ques-
tion.3 18 Unfortunately, however, clinicians appear to base capacity decisions
upon the individual's overall competence or psychiatric status, rather than
the person's capacity to consent to the particular treatment.31 9
Finally, it may also be possible to facilitate children's ability to under-
stand legal terms and concepts by explaining them in relationship to what
children already know about courts, judges, and lawyers. Decisionmaking
ability might be enhanced by teaching them decisionmaking skills relating
to their legal rights320 and health. A curriculum module has been developed
-to teach health decisionmaking skills to elementary school children.32' Similar
programs could be developed for use in schools or mental health clinics
specific to decisionmaking related to mental health issues. However, since
such decisions frequently must be made in emergency situations, there may
not be enough time to teach the child such skills before the decision must
be made.
G. Emotional Factors
Although studies demonstrate that many children, at least normal ado-
lescents, can understand their legal rights and make mature decisions, this
does not mean that they will always be able to do so. Much depends on
the individual, the particular issues, and context. Interestingly, however,
one study suggests that children who are less competent, or the most
uncertain about their decisions, are the ones most likely to seek parental
advice. 322 This suggests that children may be able effectively to recognize
when they need to seek parental advice and to self-regulate their own advice-
seeking behavior.
A child may also be able to understand certain issues but not deal with
them emotionally in ways that result in mature decisionmaking. Children's
317. RozovsKY, supra note 105, §6.2, at 365-66; Roth et al., supra note 82, at 279.
318. Additionally, researchers increasingly speculate that children may possess many
competencies which are obscured because of extraneous factors. See generally Gelman &
Baillargeon, supra note 171; ALTERNATIVES TO PlAoET: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON THE THEORY (Linda
S. Siegel & Charles J. Brainerd eds., 1978).
319. McKinnon et al., supra note 312, at 1162 (many evaluations included comments
unrelated to capacity to consent, such as "patient believes his food is poisoned," with only
6% of evaluations directly assessing capacity to consent to proposed treatment).
320. See generally June L. Tapp & Gary B. Melton, Preparing Children for Decision-
making, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE, supra note 3, at 215-34.
321. Lewis, supra note 176, at 84-89 ; de la Sota et al., AcTIoNs FOR HEALTH (1980).
322. Raye H. Rosen, Adolescent Pregnancy Decision-Making: Are Parents Important?,
57 ADOLESCENCE 43 (1980); see also supra note 284 and accompanying text.
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decisionmaking abilities appear to decline in emotionally laden situations
which have personal significance, 323 where the stress and emotional factors
might cause even adults to make decisions which do not truly reflect their
own values.32 Although such factors can result in "nonautonomous," or
nonvoluntary decisionmaking, 325 it is unclear how to evaluate the effects of
a patient's emotional state upon treatment decisionmaking.
Even if such an evaluation were possible, however, it potentially raises
concerns about the proper role of the evaluator-whether the evaluator's
judgment as to the minor's capacity would be influenced by the perceived
reasonableness of the choice made. That is, when the choice made appears
to be illogical, there may be a tendency to conclude that it is the result of
stress or emotional factors and therefore should be discounted, even if the
child has been found to be cognitively capable of consenting. Such an
approach would diminish the freedom to make risky, unpopular, or non-
traditional choices, and could easily be used simply to justify substitute
decisionmaking.
26
Psychopathology, however, can degrade a child's capacity. Psychotic
children may hallucinate or have particular difficulty in separating reality
from fantasy, although even these children may have moments of lucidity
in which they are able to participate in decisionmaking. Only delusions
related to treatment decisionmaking are relevant for informed consent
purposes. 27 One commentator has suggested that any evaluation should
consider whether there are any delusions, emotional problems, pathological
motivations, or any pathological relationships such as passive dependency
on others, that may interfere with the individual's capacity to consent.32s
VIII. CONCLUSION
Many reforms in the law are necessary if society is to recognize the
"personhood" of children. An important part of affording due process
rights to children is to give them a voice in their own life decisions. Allowing
323. See, e.g., Maria L. A. Carandang et al., The Role of Cognitive Level and Sibling
Illness in Children's Conceptualizations of Illness, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 474 (1975).
324. Bruce L. Miller, Autonomy & the Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment, 11 HAsTinGs
CENTER REP. 22 (1981).
325. Id.
326. See, e.g., Roth et al., supra note 82, at 281. Research has shown there to be little
relationship between actual choices made and level of moral development, for example. See
Lawrence Kohlberg & Daniel Candee, The Relationship of Moral Judgment to Moral Action,
in MoRALITY, MORAL BEHAVIOR, AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 52-73 (William M. Kurtines &
Jacob L. Gewirtz eds., 1984). This is a good reason why capacity should not be evaluated
solely according to the decision made, the "reasonable choice" standard. See supra note 95
and accompanying text.
327. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Waltz, 180 Cal. App. 3d 722, 227 Cal. Rptr. 436
(1986).
328. Robert Michels, Competence to Refuse Treatment, in REFusILN TREATMENT IN
MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS-VALUES IN CONFLICT 15-118 (A. Edward Doudera & Judith P.
Swazey eds., 1982), cited in Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344 n.7 (N.Y. 1986).
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children to provide informed consent for mental health treatment is partic-
ularly important because of the potentially significant liberty and privacy
interests involved, the potentially significant impact of treatment upon future
life choices such as employment opportunities, and the treatment-enhancing
effects of allowing children to participate meaningfully in treatment deci-
sionmaking. Particularly in the case of outpatient treatment, allowing chil-
dren unilaterally to consent to treatment serves the public policy interest in
facilitating access to needed treatment.
Legal reform is necessary in many states to enact minor consent statutes
that provide due process protections to juveniles by allowing them to
participate in treatment decisionmaking if competent to do so, and by
providing for judicial review in cases where significant liberty interests are
involved-civil commitment and possibly psychopharmacological treatment.
Reform should not end merely with legislation, however. Not only must
laws be enacted, but outreach programs should be developed in the schools
which inform children of their rights. If children are to be given the right
independently to seek, and consent to, outpatient psychotherapy, they need
to be informed that this right exists. The Virginia statute was found to have
a negligible impact upon the percentage of minors seeking outpatient treat-
ment, largely because most minors were unaware of the right.
3 29
We need additional research concerning children's competence to par-
ticipate in treatment decisionmaking and to provide informed consent.
Critical areas remain to be explored. How do various mental illnesses and
emotional states affect decisionmaking ability? How can a child's compe-
tence to participate in treatment decisionmaking be enhanced or facilitated?
The development of a robust body of research on these and other issues
would permit development and validation of a generic, easy-to-use test for
the lawyer to determine a child's capacity to consent to treatment.
More research is needed to provide guidance to the legal community
and society about the extent to which decisionmaking rights can and should
be extended to children of various ages. While emerging research indicates
that young adolescents are probably capable of providing informed consent
for treatment, more empirical research and theoretical development are still
required if we are to be confident of these findings and also to investigate
competence in a wider variety of contexts. While a sizeable and convincing
body of research, some of which has been reviewed in this paper, indicates
young adolescents to be capable of mature decisionmaking, we are not yet
at a point approaching certitude in our conclusions.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, society itself must decide the
extent to which it is willing to empower children by giving them certain
rights and responsibilities heretofore enjoyed solely by the adult ruling
class.330 Rousseau observed that though "Man is born free," society limits
329. Melton, Effects of a State Law, supra note 219.
330. A 1981 survey of over one thousand adults, which presented respondents with
vignettes describing parent-child conflicts over a variety of autonomy issues, found no consensus
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his freedom, so that "everywhere he is in chains.""33 Let us not as a society
limit unnecessarily the freedom of our children to develop and exercise their
decisionmaking capabilities, to obtain needed treatment in confidentiality,
and to refuse treatment when it may be harmful to their personhood and
individuality.
concerning what rights should be extended to children. In general, however, younger, better
educated adults tended to favor affording more rights to children, while older, less educated
adults tended not to favor children's rights. George W. Bohrnstedt et al., Adult Perspectives
on Children's Autonomy, 45 POE. OPINoN Q. 443, 459 (1981). Given this, it is possible that
adults may increasingly favor extending rights to children, as the educational level of the
population increases and as younger generations assume greater responsibility.
331. JEAN J. RoussEAu, THE SOCIL CONTRACT AND DiscouasEs 3 (G.D.H. Cole trans.
1950).
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED MODEL STATUTES
SECTION 1: COMPETENCE OF MINORS TO CONSENT TO
MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT, GENERALLY.
(a) Any minor, subject to statutorily-mandated minimum age require-
ments or presumptions, is competent to provide effective consent,
provided he or she can sufficiently understand, evaluate, and
appreciate the nature and consequences of the proposed treatment,
including risks, benefits, and alternatives, and consents voluntarily.
Any duly authorized mental health professional may provide such
services in reliance upon such a consent.
(b) A clinical psychologist or psychiatrist licensed to practice in the
state must determine whether the minor is competent. If a clinical
psychologist or psychiatrist is unavailable, an attorney may make
the determination in an emergency situation.
(c) The professional making the determination pursuant to subsection
(a) must certify that the minor is competent pursuant to subsection
(a), and that the consent is fully voluntary.
(d) "Consent" means either (1) consenting to treatment, or (2) refusing
to consent to treatment. Where a minor is competent to provide
an effective consent pursuant to subsection (a), but refuses to do
so, the treatment cannot be provided without court order.
SECTION 2: INPATIENT TREATMENT (For States Requiring Child's
Consent for Voluntary Commitment).
(a) Minors under the age of 15 shall not be able to provide consent
to voluntary inpatient mental health treatment.
(b) For minors age 15 and over, the presumption shall be that the
minor is not competent to consent. This presumption may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Section 1.
(c) If a minor falls to join in the consent of his parents or guardian
to the voluntary admission, the application for admission shall be
treated as a petition for involuntary commitment.
3 2
SECTION 3: INPATIENT TREATMENT (For States Not Requiring
Child's Consent for Voluntary Commitment).
(a) Any minor may provide consent for voluntary inpatient mental
health treatment.
SECTION 4: OUTPATIENT COUNSELING OR PSYCHOTHER-
APY
(a) Any competent minor may consent to counseling or psychotherapy
on an unlimited outpatient basis, subject to subsections (b), (c),
and (d).
332. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-112(4) (1991).
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(b) For minors under the age of 11, the presumption shall be that the
minor is not competent to consent. The presumption may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Section 1.
If the minor's parent, guardian or person standing in loco parentis
requests treatment for the minor, the minor cannot provide con-
sent.
(c) For minors between the ages of 11 and 14, the presumption shall
be that the minor is competent to consent. If the minor's parent,
guardian or person standing in loco parentis requests treatment
for the minor, the presumption shall be that the minor is not
competent to consent. These presumptions may be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Section 1.
(d) Minors 15 and over may consent to treatment. If the minor's
parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis requests
treatment for the minor, the presumption shall be that the minor
is competent to consent. This presumption may be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Section 1.
(e) If the minor is competent to consent, the minor's parent, guardian,
or person standing in loco parentis shall not be informed of the
outpatient counseling or psychotherapy without the consent of the
minor unless the mental health professional reasonably believes
such disclosure is necessary333 for the child's safety or emotional
wellbeing. If the mental health professional intends to disclose the
fact of counseling or psychotherapy, the minor shall be so informed
prior to the intended disclosure.1 4 If the minor objects to the
intended disclosure and discontinues treatment, the mental health
professional shall not so disclose. The minor shall be informed of
the right to discontinue treatment to prevent the intended disclo-
sure.
(0 Parents, guardians, or persons standing in loco parentis are not
liable for payment of services to which they did not consent. 35
SECTION 5: MEDICATION PROVIDED ON OUTPATIENT BASIS
FOR MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT
(a) For minors under the age of 15, the presumption shall be that the
minor is not competent to consent. This presumption may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Section 1.
(b) For minors age 15 and over, the presumption shall be that the
minor is competent to consent. This presumption may be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Section 1.
333. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 3-501(a) (Smith-Hurd 1987 & Supp. 1992).
334. Id.
335. ILL. STAT. ANm. ch. 91 1/2, §3-501(b) (Smith-Hurd 1985 & Supp. 1992).
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